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EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES
OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY: IMPLICATIONS OF
THE THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR.t
Courts in recent years have extended the boundaries of strict
products liability beyond manufacturers and commercial sellers of
new products to include a broad range of commercial suppliers of
products and product-related services.1 Some of these extensions
have become settled doctrine; a number are the subject of con-
tinuing controversy. Courts and commentators have disagreed re-
garding the criteria to be used in deciding which categories of
suppliers to include in extensions of the boundaries. Instead of
siding with any of the traditional views in this regard, this Article
suggests that an additional factor, derived from the Theory of the
Second Best, 2 should be weighed in considering whether to extend
strict liability into new areas.
In order to appreciate the relevance of this additional factor,
it will be necessary to relate it to the underlying objectives of
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1 As used in this Article, the phrase "strict products liability" means liability
in tort, imposed without regard to the defendant's fault, for harm caused by defec-
tive products or product-related services. It includes strict liability based on a
fairly wide range of warranties implied in law, including implied warranties of
merchantability and wholesomeness. It does not include strict liability based upon
contract, express warranty, implied warranty of fitness for particular purpose, mis-
representation, or any other form of strict liability based upon special communica-
tions between the defendant and other persons. The policy analysis in this Article
focuses upon the problem of identifying the categories of activities upon which to
impose strict products liability. Most frequently, the issue is whether to extend
strict liability to a category of suppliers of products or product-related services
hitherto held liable in tort only on the basis of a showing of fault. Occasionally,
the issue is whether to extend strict liability to a broader range of the activities of
suppliers already held strictly liable on a more limited basis. This Article does not
address the questions of who should be allowed to recover and what is the proper
definition of "defect."
2 The article generally cited as the principal source of the Second Best Theory
is Lipsey & Lancaster, The General Theonj of Second Best, 24 BEv. EcoN. STUn.
11 (1956). See also G. CA.LABREsr, Tie COSTS OF AccmFNTs 86-88 (1970);
E. MAsr-mr, MrcnoxcoN o cs 466-67 (3d ed. 1979); R. PosNEn, ECONOMaC
A.ALYsis OF LAw 202-03 & n.1 (2d ed. 1977).
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products liability law. This Article accepts as a premise that con-
sumers, unlike producers, generally underassess the accident costs
associated with various product-related activities, leading to market
distortions in the form of overconsumption of products in general,
and of riskier products in particular.3 Borrowing from traditional
economic analyses of strict products liability, this Article agrees
that the "first best" solution to the waste and inefficiency associated
with these distortions is to reflect defect-related accident costs gen-
erally in the prices consumers pay for commercially supplied
products. Consumers would thereby be forced more adequately
to consider safety when deciding which products to purchase and
use.4 Recognizing, however, that some product-related activities
are beyond the effective reach of strict products liability, the Article
suggests that under these circumstances the "second best" solution
may not necessarily be to reach all those commercial products
sources that strict liability could reach.
Although somewhat counterintuitive, this conclusion appears
unavoidable once it is recognized that some proposed extensions
of strict products liability establish boundaries that distinguish
legally among product-related activities that are, from the con-
sumer's viewpoint, substantially substitutable. Whenever a pro-
posed boundary extension distinguishes among substitutable
activities, consumers at the margin 5 will move away from the
product-related activities included within the boundaries of strict
liability, the prices of which more adequately reflect their true acci-
3 It is reasonable to assume that if consumers generally were able to assess
defect-related risks, producers would emphasize safety in promoting products. The
National Commission on Product Safety reached the following conclusion in its 1970
final report: "It is difficult to underestimate the knowledge of most consumers about
product safety." NATIONAL COMxSSION ON PRODUCT SAFETY, FNM. REPoRT 63
(1970).
4 See, e.g., G. CAL.Bmnsi, supra note 2, at 70; Franklin, Tort Liability for
Hepatitus: An Analysis and a Proposal, 24 STAN. L. REV. 439, 463 (1972); Green-
field, Consumer Protection in Service Transactions-Implied Warranties and Strict
Liability in Tort, 1974 UTAH L. REv. 661, 694; McKean, Products Liability: Trends
and Implications, 38 U. Cin. L. REv. 3, 41-42 (1970); Sachs, Products Liability:
An Economic View, Tnmr., Mar. 1978, at 48, 51; 11 CrEIGHTON L. REV. 1357,
1360-61 (1978); Ross, Book Review, 84 HxAv. L. REv. 1322, 1323-24 (1971)
(sanctions in addition to increasing price are necessary for dangerous activities).
5 Shifts in consumption occurring "at the margin" refer to the behavior of
those consumers for whom the choice between the two alternatives in question is
relatively close-that is, those consumers for whom a relatively small difference in
price will be significant. Obviously, given less-than-perfect substitutability, all con-
sumers are not "at the margin" in the sense intended here, and therefore not all
will change their behavior in response to price changes. It is reasonable to assume,
however, that some percentage will shift and that the size of that percentage will
be proportional to the products' relative substitutability-their cross elasticity of
demand-and to the extent of the price change. See E. MAsFmD, supra note 2,
at 118-21.
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dent costs, and toward the excluded substitutes, the prices of which
do not. Of course, these shifts at the margin will be of relatively
little concern to torts scholars if the excluded substitutes are gen-
erally safer than the activities that rely upon products and services
to which strict liability applies.6 If, however, the excluded ac-
tivities to which consumers are marginally driven are riskier than
their included counterparts, the imposition of strict liability will
exacerbate a problem of primary concern to torts scholars-over-
engagement in relatively risky activities.7 In that circumstance,
the following analysis suggests that overall safety may be enhanced
by refusing to extend, rather than by extending, the boundaries of
strict products liability. Policymakers may nevertheless decide that
the social benefits to be derived from extending those boundaries
outweigh the resulting decreases in consumer safety," but they
should not be ignorant of those effects in reaching intelligent policy
decisions.
Part I of the Article includes a brief summary of traditional
policy justifications for strict products liability, together with a
description of those areas in which consensus exists regarding the
applicability and nonapplicability of strict liability. This part
also describes areas in which the applicability of strict liability is in
dispute. Part II begins with a brief exposition of the Theory of
the Second Best. That theory's relevance to policy analysis in the
field of products liability is demonstrated by using the theory to
help explain both the original move from negligence to strict
liability and the subsequent extensions of strict liability that have
become settled doctrine. Finally, an approach to future boundary
60 Overconsumption of safer substitutes also distorts the market, but in the
opposite direction from that of primary concern in this Article: instead of accident
costs being too high, avoidance costs are too high. Although avoidance costs are
taken into account in determining whether an actor has been negligent, see, e.g.,
Judge Hand's famous calculus in United States v. Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d 169,
173 (2d Cir. 1947), and although commentators have discussed avoidance costs in
their policy analyses of tort law, see note 21 infra & accompanying text, tort law
has traditionally aimed at discouraging conduct that is too risky, rather than too
safe.
7 Clearly, the writers applying economic analysis accept accident cost reduction
as a primary goal. See authorities cited in note 4 supra. And even those torts
writers who do not explicitly rely on economic analysis recognize accident cost
reduction as an aim of tort law. See, e.g., 2 F. HAuPER & F. JAms, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 12.4 (1956); C. MoRus, MoRRIs ON TORTS 246-53 (1953); W. ThossER,
LAw OF TORTS 148-49, 659-60 (4th ed. 1971).
8 A policymaker might, for example, tolerate a higher overall accident rate in
return for the benefits derived from spreading the accident costs among a larger
number of consumers, thereby preventing ruinous consequences for consumers who
would not otherwise be protected. See note 17 infra & accompanying text. More-
over, notions of fairness frequently justify resource allocations that are inefficient.
See generally G. CALArIPEsr, supra note 2, at 18-21.
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extensions, consistent with the implications of Second Best Theory,
is prescribed.
I. EXTENDING THE BOUNDARIES OF STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILrrY
A. Traditional Policy Justifications
For purposes of this Article, the specific content of the social
policies that have prompted courts to begin imposing strict liability
upon suppliers of products and product-related services is less
significant than the fact that some set of policy considerations
has prompted such a beginning. Once strict liability was initially
imposed, the task of reviewing and periodically revising its bound-
aries was unavoidable; because the following analysis is uniquely
concerned with the effects of setting boundaries as such, it is im-
portant irrespective of the policies supporting strict products lia-
bility.9 Appreciation of the underlying policies will, however, help
to place the following analysis in its proper perspective.
Among the justifications traditionally advanced in support of
strict products liability are the following: 10 (1) because commercial
suppliers of products and product-related services presumably
profit from their activities, notions of fairness require them to
compensate innocent victims injured by defective products and
services regardless of supplier fault; 11 (2) because defective
9Even the initial decision to impose strict products liability on new products
manufacturers may be viewed as a boundary decision, however. And as text accom-
panying notes 167-81 infra indicates, that decision also minimizes the distortion
effects with which this analysis is concerned.
10 justifications for imposing strict liability have been advanced in terms other
than those employed in the text following this note. For example, statements such
as "[niothing will protect [consumers] effectively but wholesome [products],"
Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1936), are occasionally encoun-
tered in appellate opinions. Such observations are obviously in error insofar as
they suggest that a defect-free world is either attainable or desirable. Avoidance
costs would increase enormously, and unacceptably, as zero defect rates were ap-
proached. See generally note 6 supra and note 21 infra & accompanying text.
Rephrased to suggest that failure to meet consumer expectations justifies the imposi-
tion of liability, however, such assertions become merely different ways of stating
one or more of the justifications described in the text.
11 See, e.g., Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612, 619, 210 N.E.2d 182,
186 (1965); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 69 III. App. 3d 1, 6, 386 N.E.2d
1126, 1130 (1978); Bainter v. Lamoine LP Gas Co., 24 III. App. 3d 913, 916, 321
N.E.2d 744, 745 (1974) (quoting Suvada); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet
Co., 17 II. App. 3d 690, 693, 307 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1974) (quoting Suvada),
rev'd on other grounds, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 20, 329 N.E.2d 785, 786 (1975); Furrow,
Defective Mental Treatment: A Proposal for the Application of Strict Liability to
Psychiatric Services, 58 B.U. L. REv. 391, 414 (1978); Note, Products and the
Professional: Strict Liability in the Sales-Service Hybrid Transaction, 24 HASTwNaS
LJ. 111, 125-26, 132 (1972); Note, Application of Strict Liability to Repairers:
A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865,
878-79 (1977).
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products and product-related services present extraordinary risks,
it is only fair that the suppliers of such risky products and services
compensate their innocent victims; 12 (3) because consumers rely
on suppliers for adequate protection, they should be allowed to
recover when that protection is not provided; 13 (4) although negli-
gence law theoretically forces suppliers of products and services to
achieve socially optimal defect rates,14 in practice these suppliers es-
cape a portion of negligence-based liability due to the problems
of proof encountered by plaintiffs; strict liability forces these more
efficient cost minimizers to come closer to optimal defect rates; 15
(5) unlike producers, consumers generally underassess the accident
costs associated with defective products and services, leading to
overconsumption of products in general and of relatively risky
products in particular; by causing the prices of products and
services to reflect more fully their defect-related accident costs,
strict liability helps to reduce this overconsumption and thus to
reduce the overall costs of defect-related accidents; 16 and (6) by
helping to spread the costs of defect-related accidents among those
who consume products, strict liability performs the social insur-
ance function of reducing the dislocation costs of those accidents.
17
12 See, e.g., Bainter v. Lamoine LP Gas Co., 24 Ill. App. 3d 913, 916, 321
N.E.2d 744, 745 (1974) (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 11. 2d 612, 619,
210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965)); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 90, 207
A.2d 314, 325 (1965); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379,
391 (1977); 11 CrcrrTo L. REv. 1357, 1359 (1978). The theoretical basis for
premising tort liability upon the creation of nonreciprocal risks is developed in
Fletcher, Fairness and Utility in Tort Theory, 85 HARv. L. REv. 537 (1972).
13 See, e.g., Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 867 (D.C. Cir. 1936); George
v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (W.D. Wis. 1976); Kriegler v. Eichler Homes,
Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 228-29, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749, 752-53 (1969); Worrell v.
Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 207-08, 484 P.2d 573, 575-76 (1971); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck
Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 446-50, 212 A.2d 769, 775-78 (1965); Jerry v. Borden Co.,
45 A.D.2d 344, 348-49, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426, 431-32 (1974).
14 See notes 6 & 7 supra. For the thesis that, absent transaction costs, parties
would bargain their way to optimal points irrespective of the nature of the liability
rule, see Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960).
15 See, e.g., La Rossa v. Scientific Design Co., 402 F.2d 937, 942 (3d Cir.
1968); Walla v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 618, 619 (E.D. Wis. 1977) (quoting
La Rossa); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391 (1977);
Furrow, supra note 11, at 410-13, 415-16; 11 CREio1rroN L. REv. 1357, 1361 (1978).
16 See, e.g., authorities cited in note 4 supra.
17 See, e.g., Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 328 (Alaska 1970); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 368-69, 372 A.2d
736, 739 (1977); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468, 256 N.W.2d 379, 391
(1977); Furrow, supra note 11, at 414-15. But see Sachs, Negligence or Strict
Products Liability: Is There Really a Difference in Law or Economics?, 8 GA. J.
br'L & COMP. L. 259, 271-73 (1978). The theoretical bases of the cost-spreading
objective are developed in C. CA.ABREsr, supra note 2, at 39-45.
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From a somewhat broader perspective, these traditional justi-
fications for strict products liability may be viewed as furthering
two overall objectives pursued generally by systems of tort liability:
fairness, in the sense of furthering shared notions of social moral-
ity; and efficiency, in the sense of eliminating unnecessary accident
costs.'8 The former objective is reflected primarily in the first
three justifications listed above; the latter objective, primarily in
the last three.'9 Because the analysis that follows is concerned
predominantly with the potential for market distortions inherent
in extending the boundaries of strict products liability, it speaks
most directly to those who view strict liability, at least in part, as a
means of achieving more efficient allocations of society's resources.
However, the very real possibility that boundary extensions may
promote, rather than discourage, relatively risky activities for which
compensation is not available should render the analysis of interest
even to those who doubt that strict products liability promotes
allocative efficiency.
Given the relevance of allocative efficiency to this Article, a
brief treatment of that concept is in order. To the welfare econ-
omist, optimally efficient resource allocations occur when it is im-
possible for any individual to gain by further exchange without
causing loss to another individual. 20 More specifically, in the con-
text of strict products liability, allocative efficiency is attained when
the sum of the costs of incurring defect-related accidents and the
costs of avoiding such accidents is at a minimum-that is, when
accident costs cannot be lowered without an increase in avoidance
costs of greater magnitude, and vice versa.21  Of the efficiency-
oriented justifications for strict products liability, the one that is
18 See generally Fletcher, supra note 12.
19 The last three justifications, though primarily reflecting the efficiency ob~ec-
tive, also reflect notions of fairness to some extent. Cost spreading, for example, is
frequently advanced as a way of achieving fairness. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola
Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor, J., con-
curring); McKean, supra note 4, at 39. And some of the efficiency justifications
are mutually antagonistic if pushed to the extreme. For example, when cost spread-
ing in the form of social insurance is pursued as an end in itself, it undermines the
general deterrence objective. See G. CALABRESi, supra note 2, at 43-44, 64-67,
281-82.
20 This condition is commonly referred to as "Pareto optimality," after the
Italian economist Wilfred Pareto, who originated the concept. See generally
E. MANrsFr.EL, supra note 2, at 443-44; McKean, supra note 4, at 30.
21 See generally G. CALAB.Esr, supra note 2, at 26. Given the economists
standard assumption of zero transaction costs, if the investment of one dollar in
avoidance measures would reduce accident costs by more than one dollar, the
interested parties would bargain their way to that expenditure. If reducing accident
costs by one dollar would cost ten dollars in avoidance measures, the investment
presumably would not be made.
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most directly relevant in the following analysis is the fifth objective
outlined above, the one aimed at achieving what has been termed
"market deterrence." 22 According to that justification, consumers
are presumed incapable of adequately assessing the accident costs
associated with defective products.3 By causing the prices of
commercially supplied products and services to reflect these acci-
dent costs, strict liability results in appropriately reduced consump-
tion of relatively risky products and services, and a corresponding
reduction in related accident costs. It is assumed that commercial
producers and suppliers are able to assess (and thus efficiently to
insure against) such risks2-4 and to pass on the related costs to con-
sumers in the form of price increases.2 5
B. Areas of Consensus Regarding Commercial Enterprises
Included Within the Boundaries
1. Manufacturers and Other Commercial Sellers of
New Products
The universal rule in American products liability law is that a
manufacturer is strictly liable for the physical harm 26 proximately
22 See generally G. CAxABmnsr, supra note 2, at 27 (prefers to use term "general
deterrence," but views them as interchangeable); J. O'CoNmL.r., ENDING INSULT TO
INJURY 76-80 (1975).
23 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
24 See, e.g., George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (W.D. Wis. 1976);
Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 440-41 (1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 468-69, 256 N.W.2d
379, 391 (1977); Greenfield, supra note 4, at 688; Note, Application of Strict Lia-
bility to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction,
8 PAc. L.J. 865, 874-75 (1977); 11 CRE GHTON L. REv. 1357, 1360 (1978).
25 See, e.g., Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 869 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Escola v.
Coca Cola Bottling Co., 24 Cal. 2d 453, 462, 150 P.2d 436, 441 (1944) (Traynor,
J., concurring); Francioni v. Gibsonia Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 368-69, 372 A.2d
736, 739 (1977); Franklin, supra note 4, at 462-64; Greenfield, supra note 4, at
694-95; Morris, Enterprise Liability and the Actuarial Process-The Insignificance
of Foresight, 70 YALE L.J. 554, 584-86 (1961); 11 CRpEIHToN L. REv. 1357,
1360-61 (1978).
26 Courts are divided over whether a plaintiff may recover for commercial
losses as well as for physical injuries. Compare Anthony v. Kelsey-Hayes Co., 25
Cal. App. 3d 442, 447, 102 Cal. Rptr. 113, 116 (1972) (denying recovery for
commercial losses), and Eli Lilly & Co. v. Casey, 472 S.W.2d 598, 599-600 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1971) (same), with Santor v. A & M Karagheusian, Inc., 44 N.J. 52,
59-63, 207 A.2d 305, 309-11 (1965) (allowing recovery). See also States Steam-
ship Co. v. Stone Manganese Marine, Ltd., 371 F. Supp. 500, 504 (D.N.J. 1973).
It is now generally accepted that third parties, not just users and purchasers,
may recover for injuries proximately caused by unreasonably dangerous products.
See, e.g., Sills v. Massey-Ferguson, Inc., 296 F. Supp. 776, 780-82 (D. Ind. 1969);
Elmore v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 586, 451 P.2d 84, 88-89, 75
Cal. Rptr. 652, 656-57 (1969); Mitchell v. Miller, 26 Conn. Supp. 142, 145-50,
214 A.2d 694, 696-99 (Super. Ct. 1965). Indeed, one court has held that fore-
seeability constitutes no part of strict liability doctrine. Howes v. Hansen, 56
Wis. 2d 247, 258-59, 201 N.W.2d 825, 830-31 (1972).
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caused by those of its products shown to have been defective and
unreasonably dangerous 2 7 when sold new by the manufacturer.
28
This basic rule generally applies to all other commercial sellers in
the chain of distribution, including wholesalers 29 and retailers.30
Courts have been fairly generous toward injured plaintiffs in de-
fining sale of a product. As long as the defendant is a commercial
seller, for example, defective products distributed as free samples
are treated as having been sold for strict liability purposes.31 Sim-
ilarly, consumers injured by defective demonstration models 32 and
27 The Restatement of Torts indicates that, in order to impose strict liability on
a commercial seller, the product causing the injury must have been in a "defective
condition unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer." RESTATEMENT (SEcoNn)
OF TonTs § 402A (1965). This formulation suggests that the product must have
been both defective and unreasonably dangerous. Although some courts have
accepted this view, see, e.g., Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353,
1362-63 (Okla. 1974), others have required only that the product have been defec-
tive, see, e.g., Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 133-35, 501 P.2d 1153,
1162-63, 104 Cal. Rptr. 433, 442-43 (1972).
28 See, e.g., Greenman v. Yuba Power Prods., Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 63-64, 377
P.2d 897, 901, 27 Cal. Rptr. 697, 701 (1963); Hiigel v. General Motors Corp., 190
Colo. 57, 64-65, 544 P.2d 983, 989 (1975) (inadequate warning renders product
"defective"); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 333, 338, 154 N.W.2d
488, 496, 500 (1967) (inadequate warning); Kohler v. Ford Motor Co., 187 Neb.
428, 436, 191 N.W.2d 601, 606 (1971). See generally RESTATEMENT (SEcoND) o.F
TOTs § 402A (1965); Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the
Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960); Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability
for Products, 44 Miss. L.J. 825 (1973).
Sellers of component parts are generally treated as products sellers. See, e.g.,
Sevits v. McKiernan-Terry Corp., 264 F. Supp. 810, 814 (S.D.N.Y. 1966) (suit
against manufacturer of component part of naval vessel allowed when suit against
vessel manufacturer was not possible); Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
623, 210 N.E.2d 182, 188 (1965) (manufacturer of defective tractor brake held
liable when tractor manufacturer merely installed brake); Clark v. Bendix Corp.,
42 A.D.2d 727, 728, 345 N.Y.S.2d 662, 663-64 (1973). But see Goldberg v.
Kollsman Instr. Corp., 12 N.Y.2d 432, 437, 240 N.Y.S.2d 592, 595, 191 N.E.2d 81,
83 (1963).
29 See, e.g., Canifax v. Hercules Powder Co., 237 Cal. App. 2d 44, 50-52, 46
Cal. Rptr. 552, 556-59 (1965) (wholesaler); Cottom v. McGuire Funeral Serv.,
Inc., 262 A.2d 807, 809-10 (D.C. 1970) (retailer and wholesaler); Keener v. Dayton
Elec. Mfg. Co., 445 S.W.2d 362, 365 (Mo. 1969) (wholesaler); Walker v. Decora,
Inc., 225 Tenn. 504, 514-15, 471 S.W.2d 778, 782-83 (1971) (distributor); Dippel
v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 462, 155 N.W.2d 55, 64-65 (1967) (sales distributor).
30 See, e.g., LaGorga v. Kroger Co., 275 F. Supp. 373, 375-76 (W.D. Pa.
1967); Elmore'v. American Motors Corp., 70 Cal. 2d 578, 583, 451 P.2d 84, 87,
75 Cal. Rptr. 652, 655 (1969); Rogers v. Karem, 405 S.W.2d 741, 742 (Ky. 1966);
Piercefield v. Remington Arms Co., 375 Mich. 85, 99, 133 N.NV.2d 129, 135 (1965);
RESTATEmENT (SEcomN) OF TonTs § 402A, Comment f (1965).
81 See, e.g., Pease v. Sinclair Ref. Co., 104 F.2d 183, 186-87 (2d Cir. 1939)
(negligent failure to warn of danger of free set of oil samples); McKisson v. Sales
Affiliates, Inc., 416 S.W.2d 787, 792 (Tex. 1967) (defective hair lotion distributed
as advertising sample).
32 See, e.g., Delaney v. Towmotor Corp., 339 F.2d 4, 6 (2d Cir. 1964) (allow-
ing recovery by employee of prospective purchaser injured by demonstration fork
lift truck); First Nat'l Bank v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 365 So. 2d 966, 968 (Ala. 1978)
(advisory opinion to federal district court declaring that strict liability doctrine
applies in cases involving demonstration models and free samples).
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by defective products that cause harm prior to actual purchase 33
are able to recover under a theory of strict liability. An exception
to this pattern of judicial generosity is the refusal to apply strict
liability to isolated sales of products by commercial enterprises that
are not in the business of selling products of the same type as those
causing the injury.M
2. Commercial Lessors
The most significant extension of the boundaries of strict
products liability is the inclusion of commercial products lessors
in the category of suppliers held strictly liable for product -defects.35
In a landmark decision, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held
the commercial lessor of a truck fleet strictly liable for injuries to
the driver-employee of the lessee. 36 Relying doctrinally upon im-
plied warranty concepts, the court concluded that "the relationship
between the parties fairly calls for an implied warranty of fitness
for use, at least equal to that assumed by a new car manufacturer." 37
Commentators have praised this extension as consistent with the
policy objectives of strict products liability.38 With few excep-
tions,39 courts have imposed strict liability on commercial lessors
33 See, e.g., Gillispie v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 14 N.C. App. 1, 5-6, 187
S.E.2d 441, 444 (1972) (bottle exploded in self-service store before customer had
paid for it); Barker v. Allied Supermarket, 596 P.2d 870, 871 (Okla. 1979) (implied
warranty of merchantability in self-service store).
34 See, e.g., Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 964-65, 341 N.E.2d 713,
715-16 (1975); Stapinski v. Walsh Constr. Co., 383 N.E.2d 473, 475 (Ind. Ct. App.
1978); U.C.C. § 2-314(1); RESTATEMENT (SEvcoND) oF Toas § 402A, Comment f
(1965).
35 See, e.g., Price v. Shell Oil Co., 2 Cal. 3d 245, 248, 466 P.2d 722, 723, 85
Cal. Rptr. 178, 179 (1970); Fakhoury v. Magner, 25 Cal. App. 3d 58, 63, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 473, 476 (1972); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 325-26, 82 Cal. Rptr.
420, 423 (1970) (user of coin-operated washing machine allowed to recover as
licensee of launderette owner); McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal.
App. 2d 446, 450, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 339 (1969); Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing
& Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 456, 212 A.2d 769, 781 (1965); Francioni v. Gibsonia
Truck Corp., 472 Pa. 362, 369-70, 372 A.2d 736, 739-40 (1977).
36 Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing, 45 N.J. 434, 456, 212 A.2d 769, 781
(1965).
37 Id. at 449-50, 212 A.2d at 777.
38 See, e.g., Comment, Strict Liability of the Bailor, Lessor and Licensor, 57
MARQ. L. PEv. 111, 139 (1973); Comment, Products Liability-Liabilty of the
Bailor for Hire for Personal Injuries Caused by Defective Goods, 51 N.C. L. REv.
786, 802 (1973).
39 See, e.g., Torres v. Southern Pac. Transp. Co., 584 F.2d 900, 902 (9th Cir.
1978) (alternative holding) (lessors not held strictly liable in Arizona); Katz v.
Slade, 460 S.W.2d 608, 613-14 (Mo. 1970) (strict liability inapplicable to "non-
commercial" municipally operated recreational facility); Nastasi v. Hochman, 58
A.D.2d 564, 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (1977) (alternative holding) (strict lia-
bility has not been extended to lessors in New York).
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of a broad range of products,40 including motor vehicles,41 air-
craft,42 tools, 43 and machinery.44
3. Commercial Sellers of New Housing
Another generally accepted extension of strict products lia-
bility doctrine is the inclusion of commercial sellers of new housing
in the category of commercial sellers of products. 45 Historically,
the major impediment to their inclusion was the notion that the
term "product" did not readily apply to real property.46 Addi-
tionally, courts assumed that purchasers of real property were as
able as sellers to inspect for defects,47 and most of the cases did not
involve personal injuries.
48
The widespread development of mass-production techniques in
the housing industry in the decades following World War II pro-
vided the factual basis for the eventual elimination of these con-
ceptual impediments. Real estate developers began manufacturing
40 See generally Annot., 52 A.L.R.3d 121 (1973).
41 See, e.g., Stewart v. Budget Rent-A-Car Corp., 52 Hawaii 71, 72, 470 P.2d
240, 243 (1970) (automobile); Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 63 II. App. 3d
985, 986, 380 N.E.2d 819, 820 (1978) (golf cart); Galluccio v. Hertz Corp., 1 Ill.
App. 3d 272, 274, 274 N.E.2d 178, 179 (1971) (van); Stang v. Hertz Corp., 83
N.M. 730, 731, 497 P.2d 732, 733 (1972) (car).
42 See, e.g., George v. Tonjes, 414 F. Supp. 1199, 1201 (W.D. Wis. 1976);
Bachner v. Pearson, 479 P.2d 319, 321 (Alaska 1970); Rudisaile v. Hawk Aviation,
Inc., 92 N.M. 575, 576, 592 P.2d 175, 176 (1979). But see Nastasi v. Hechman,
58 A.D.2d 564, 564, 396 N.Y.S.2d 216, 217 (1977) (isolated and casual lease).
43 See, e.g., McClaflin v. Bayshore Equip. Rental Co., 274 Cal. App. 2d 446,
448, 79 Cal. Rptr. 337, 338 (1969) (rented stepladder).
44 See, e.g., Nath v. National Equip. Leasing Corp., 473 Pa. 178, 179, 373
A.2d 1105, 1106 (1977). But see Luna v. Rossville Packing Co., 54 Ill. App. 3d
290, 293, 369 N.E.2d 612, 614 (1977) (isolated lease).
4 5 See, e.g., Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973);
Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 74 Cal. Rptr. 749 (1969);
Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965); Hartley v. Ballou,
286 N.C. 51, 209 S.E.2d 776 (1974); Elderkin v. Caster, 447 Pa. 118, 288 A.2d
771 (1972); Rutledge v. Dodenhoff, 254 S.C. 407, 175 S.E.2d 792 (1970); Vincent
v. Jim Walter Homes, Inc., [19781 PoD. LiB. REP. (CCH) ff8278 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1978); Humber v. Morton, 426 S.W.2d 554 (Tex. 1968). See generally
Anmot., 25 A.L.R.3d 383 (1969); Comment, The Expanding Scope of Liability in
the Home Construction Enterprise, 5 LAND & WAmm L. REv. 637 (1970); Note,
Builder-Vender Liability for Construction Defects in Houses, 55 MAEQ. L. REv. 369
(1972); 35 Mo. L. Rrv. 239 (1970).
46 See, e.g., Lowrie v. City of Evanston, 50 Ill. App. 3d 376, 384, 365 N.E.2d
923, 928 (1977).
47 See, e.g., Conolley v. Bull, 258 Cal. App. 2d 183, 195-96, 65 Cal. Rptr. 689,
696 (1968).
48 The only cases cited in note 45 supra that involved personal injuries were
Hyman v. Gordon, 35 Cal. App. 3d 769, 111 Cal. Rptr. 262 (1973), and Schipper
v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965). On the whole, courts
have been more sympathetic to plaintiffs suffering personal injuries than to plaintiffs
suffering other types of harm.
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houses on enormous tracts,4 9 and courts came to realize that the
individual purchasers of mass-produced homes are typically in no
better position to inspect for defects than are the purchasers of
mass-produced automobiles.50 Moreover, in many cases the struc-
tural components alleged to have been defective at time of sale
were manufactured items that clearly would have qualified as
"products" had they not been attached to realty when sold by the
defendant. 5' In the same year that it imposed strict liability on
commercial-products lessors, the Supreme Court of New Jersey
extended the boundaries to include commercial sellers of mass-
produced housing.52  With few exceptions,53 courts in other states
have followed New Jersey's lead, even in cases involving the com-
mercial sale of new, custom-built homes.54 A recent decision by
the New Jersey Superior Court explicitly applies strict liability to
all commercial sellers of housing, regardless of their size or their
use of mass-production methods.55 By and large, scholars have
praised these decisions. 56
4. Restaurant Operators
Early decisions refused to impose strict liability on restaurant
operators because their activities, though commercial, were thought
to involve the provision of services rather than the sale of products.57
49 See generally Keerdoja, "Mr. Levitt's Town," N-wswEm, Oct. 11, 1976, at
18.
50 See, e.g., Kriegler v. Eichler Homes, Inc., 269 Cal. App. 2d 224, 226-29, 74
Cal. Rptr. 749, 752-53 (1969); Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 91-92,
207 A.2d 314, 325-26 (1965); Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 179-80,
379 A.2d 297, 298-99 (Law Div. 1977).
51 For example, in Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314
(1965), the "product" that caused injury was a hot water heating system. In
Patitucci v. Drelich, 153 N.J. Super. 177, 379 A.2d 297 (Law Div. 1977), the
defective "product" was the sewage system designed for the house. Of course,
manufacturers of defective products are liable notvithstanding the fact that their
products are incorporated into real property. See U.C.C. § 2-105(1) (definition of
"goods").
52 Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70, 207 A.2d 314 (1965).
53 See, e.g., Bruce Farms, Inc. v. Coupe, 247 S.E.2d 400 (Va. 1978).
54 See authorities cited in note 45 supra.
55 McDonald v. Mianecki, 159 N.J. Super. 1, 19-20, 386 A.2d 1325, 1335 (App.
Div. 1979).
56 See, e.g., Bearman, Caveat Emptor in Sales of Realty-Recent Assaults Upon
the Rule, 14 VAND. L. 11v. 541 (1961); Haskell, The Case for an Implied Warranty
of Quality in Sales of Real Property, 53 CEo. L.J. 633 (1965); Roberts, The Case
of the Unwary Home Buyer: The Housing Merchant Did It, 52 CoRNELL L.Q. 835
(1967).
57 See Merrill v. Hodson, 88 Conn. 314, 91 A. 533 (1914); Pappa v. F.W.
Woolworth Co., 33 A.2d 310 (Del. Super. Ct. 1943); Child's Dining Hall Co. v.
Swingler, 173 Md. 490, 197 A. 105 (1938); Nisky v. Childs Co., 103 N.J.L. 464,
135 A. 805 (1927).
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However, assisted doctrinally by section 2-314 (1) of the Uniform
Commercial Code, which explicitly treats such transactions as sales
for implied warranty purposes, courts today generally impose strict
liability upon restaurant operators for defects in food and drink
served to customers."8 In an early decision holding that implied
warranties of wholesomeness and merchantability accompanied the
serving of prepared food, the United States Court of Appeals for
the District of Columbia expressly recognized the applicability of
two of the policy justifications for strict liability discussed earlier-
customers' reliance on restaurant operators' judgment and negli-
gence law's failure to force these operators to approach optimal
defect rates. 9
C. Areas of Consensus Regarding Activities
Excluded from the Boundaries
Two types of suppliers should be distinguished: (1) those who
supply unsafe and defective products, but in noncommercial con-
texts; and (2) those whose activities are commercial but do not
involve supplying "products." In cases involving the first type of
supplier, courts unanimously refuse to impose strict liability, even
when the supplier sells the product.6 0 Inevitably, some cases come
close to the line between commercial and noncommercial activity,61
but most are fairly easy to categorize. Thus, when someone gives,
lends, or sells to a neighbor a defective product that subsequently
causes an injury, the transferor is liable in tort only if the injured
68 See, e.g., Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864 (D.C. Cir. 1936); Ray v. Deas,
112 Ga. App. 191, 144 S.E.2d 468 (1965); Heise v. Gillette, 83 Ind. App. 551,
149 N.E. 182 (1925); Deris v. Finest Foods, Inc., 198 So. 2d 412 (La. Ct App.
1967); Zorinsky v. American Legion, Omaha Post No. 1, 163 Neb. 212, 79 N.W.2d
172 (1956); Sofrnan v. Denham Food Serv., Inc., 37 N.J. 304, 181 A.2d 168
(1962); Betehia v. Cape Cod Corp., 10 Wis. 2d 323, 103 N.W.2d 64 (1960).
Although these cases rely on the doctrine of implied warranty, they are still "strict
products liability" cases, as that phrase is defined in note 1 supra.
69 Cushing v. Rodman, 82 F.2d 864, 868-70 (D.C. Cir. 1936). See text
accompanying notes 13-15 supra.
60 See, e.g., Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1376 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(sale); Shook v. Jacuzzi, 59 Cal. App. 3d 978, 129 Cal. Rptr. 496 (1976) (no
sale); Balido v. Improved Mach. Inc., 29 Cal. App. 3d 633, 105 Cal. Rptr. 890
(1973) (single sale); Siemen v. Alden, 34 Ill. App. 3d 961, 341 N.E.2d 713
(1975) (isolated sale); Stapiski v. Walsh Constr. Co., 383 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1978) (nondealer sale); McKenna v. Art Pearl Works, Inc., 225 Pa. Super.
Ct. 362, 310 A.2d 677 (1973) ("not in business"); RESTAT EMNT (SEcolm) oF
Tours § 402A, Comment f (1965).
61 See, e.g., Wentzel v. Berliner, 204 So. 2d 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967),
cert. denied, 212 So. 2d 871 (Fla. 1968) (commercial caterer who gratuitously
prepared food at church supper not held to strict liability).
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party can prove negligence.62  Doctrinally, the rule excluding non-
commercial suppliers derives from the fact that implied warranties
arise only in commercial sales.63 Furthermore, the policy justifi-
cations supporting strict products liability do not so readily apply
to noncommercial transactions. For example, because the trans-
ferors in such cases typically do not realize a profit, principles of
fairness do not so clearly require that they be held strictly liable.
More significant, the objective of market deterrence cannot be
achieved by imposing strict liability upon such suppliers. Because
these suppliers cannot assess defect-related risks or pass them on
effectively, imposing strict liability would not cause the prices of
noncommercially supplied products to reflect their accident costs.
Nor would imposing such liability effectively alter patterns of
product consumption. Thus, although individual noncommercial
suppliers could be held strictly liable, no broader policies would
thereby be served.
The commercial activities of those in the second category do
not sufficiently involve the supplying of products to be embraced
easily by the phrase "strict products liability." 6 Examples of these
activities, which are sometimes referred to by commentators as
"pure services," 65 include services furnished by health care pro-
viders, 66 architects, 67 product repairers," attorneys, 69 engineers,70
62 See RESTATEuMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A, Comment f (1965). See
also Stapinski v. Walsh Constr. Co., 383 N.E.2d 473 (Ind. Ct App. 1978). As a
practical matter, however, the limited access of noncommercial sellers to pertinent
information makes their exposure for negligent misrepresentation relatively insig-
nificant.
63 See U.C.C. § 2-314(1).
64 Cases involving the provision of services in connection with the sale of
products or product components are discussed in the text accompanying notes 98-117
infra.
65 See, e.g., Sales, The Service-Sales Transaction: A Citadel Under Assault, 10
ST. MARY's L.J. 13 (1978); Comment, What Is or Is Not a Product Within the
Meaning of Section 402A, 57 MARQ. L. REv. 625, 640-41 (1974); Comment, Sales-
Service Hybrid Transactions: A Policy Approach, 28 Sw. L.J. 575 (1974).
6GSee, e.g., Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis.
1973); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 256 N.W.2d 379 (1977).
67 See, e.g., Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc.
2d 804, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
6
8 See, e.g., Pepsi Cola Bottling Co. v. Superior Burner Serv. Co., 427 P.2d
833 (Alaska 1967); Aegis Prod., Inc. v. Arriflex Corp. of America, 25 A.D.2d 639,
268 N.Y.S.2d 185 (1966).
69 See, e.g., Lucas v. Hamm, 56 Cal. 2d 583, 364 P.2d 685, 15 Cal. Rptr. 821
(1961); Young v. Bridwell, 20 Utah 2d 332, 437 P.2d 686 (1968); Denzer v. Rouse,
48 Wis. 2d 528, 180 N.W.2d 521 (1970). Although the plaintiffs in these cases
did ground their claims in negligence, the courts implicitly held that attorneys were
only liable on the basis of fault.
70 See, e.g., Swett v. Gribaldo, Jones & Assocs., 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 115
Cal. Rptr. 99 (1974); Allied Properties v. John A. Blume & Assocs., 25 Cal. App. 3d
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and others.7' Although some scholars have urged that the bound-
aries of strict products liability be extended to include pure
services,72 most courts have refused to do so.73 The policy con-
siderations supporting the courts' consensus have not been articu-
lated clearly or convincingly in the decisions. Aside from the
conclusion that these defendants were not supplying products, 74
many courts have based the refusal to impose strict products lia-
bility on the assertion that the defendants were selling services, not
848, 102 Cal. Rptr. 259 (1972); Laukkanen v. Jewel Tea Co., 78 I1. App. 2d 153,
222 N.E.2d 584 (1966).
71See, e.g., Walla v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Wis. 1977)
(federal government not strictly liable for faulty technical assistance in the form
of design plans for a cow yard); Pena v. Sita World Travel, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d
642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1978) (travel agency, which prepared package tour, not
strictly liable to plaintiff injured on a bus); Endicott v. Nissan Motor Corp., 73
Cal. App. 3d 917, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95 (1977) (seat belt installer not strictly
liable when not an "integral part" of defendant's marketing enterprise); Immergluck
v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 472, 368 N.E.2d 803 (1977) (defendant
"sheltered care' facility not strictly liable for injuries plaintiff suffered when she
fell out of fourth-floor window).
72 See, e.g., Baldwin, Products Liability as It Applies to Service Transactions,
43 J. Am L. & Com. 323 (1977) (urging application of strict liability to all
services); Greenfield, supra note 4 (to all services); Note, Application of Strict
Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial
Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865 (1977) (to repair services). See also 11 CaumHToN L.
REv. 1357 (1978) (discusses pros and cons of extending strict liability to medical
services).
73See, e.g., Walla v. United States, 432 F. Supp. 618 (E.D. Wis. 1977); Gagne
v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 275 P.2d 15 (1954); Pena v. Sita World Travel, Inc.,
88 Cal. App. 3d 642, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17 (1978); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 376 A.2d 88 (Del. 1977); Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 53
Ill. App. 3d 472, 368 N.E.2d 803 (1977); Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v.
Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832 (Sup. Ct. 1977); Parker v.
Warren, 503 S.W.2d 938 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973). But cf. Johnson v. Sears, Roebuck
& Co., 355 F. Supp. 1065 (E.D. Wis. 1973) (strict liability applicable to mechanical
and administrative hospital services); Broyles v. Brown Eng'r Co., 151 So. 2d 767
(Ala. 1963) (defendant strictly liable for faulty drainage system plan under an
implied warranty of fitness that the plans would reasonably accomplish the purposes
for which intended); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev. 204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971) (leaky
gas fitting within definition of defective product, hence installer strictly liable).
74 See, e.g., Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954);
Endicott v. Nissan Motors Corp., 73 Cal. App. 3d 917, 930, 141 Cal. Rptr. 95, 103
(1977); Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter Corp., 91 Misc. 2d
804, 806, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832, 833 (Sup. Ct. 1977). See Greenfield, supra note 4,
at 683. Some of the cases that are traditionally classified as professional pure
service cases arguably belong in the sale-service hybrid category. See text
accompanying notes 98-117 infra. One commentator argues that the attorney's
work product (e.g., deed, will, brief) should be considered a product for strict
liability purposes. Reynolds, Strict Liability for Commercial Services-Will Another
Citadel Crumble?, 30 OimA. L. REv. 298, 303 (1977). This argument would apply
also to architects' plans, engineers' plans, and reports prepared by surveyors. But
see Note, Application of Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative
Action in the Face of judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865, 869 (1977) (no strict
liability if value of service depends on "skill, training and education" of provider).
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insurance. 715 In addition, many courts have relied on precedent in
its "driest" form and declined to impose strict liability because they
had never done so in the past.76 Scholars favoring the extension
of strict liability to pure services have expressed concern that waste-
ful market distortions may occur if the accident costs associated
with various services are not reflected in the prices charged the
consumer.
77
D. Areas of Continuing Controversy
The cases in this section involve categories of commercial-
products suppliers whose inclusion within the boundaries of strict
products liability is the subject of continuing judicial controversy.
These suppliers may be arranged into three basic categories: used-
products sellers, suppliers of sale-service hybrids, and nonsale sup-
pliers. Although the first category is self-descriptive, the distinction
between the second and third requires explanation. Sellers in both
of these categories supply products to consumers, but they do so in
different ways. In sales-service hybrids, a product is typically
delivered to and consumed by the buyer in the course of the seller's
rendering a service. In the usual case, the product permanently
leaves the seller's possession, or is used up in the course of the
7- The amount of his fee and the fact that he was paid by the hour also
indicate that [the defendant] was selling service and not insurance.
Thus the general rule is applicable that those who sell their services for
the guidance of others in their economic, financial, and personal affairs are
not liable in the absence of negligence or intentional misconduct.
Gagne v. Bertran, 43 Cal. 2d 481, 487, 275 P.2d 15, 20 (1954). See Pena v. Sita
World Travel, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 642, 644, 152 Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (1978); Swett
v. Gribaldo, Jones & Assocs., 40 Cal. App. 3d 573, 575-76, 115 Cal. Rptr. 99, 101
(1974); Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 53 Ill. App. 3d 472, 475, 368
N.E.2d 803, 805 (1977); Queensbury Union Free School Dist. v. Jim Walter
Corp., 91 Misc. 2d 804, 806, 398 N.Y.S.2d 832, 835 (Sup. Ct. 1977).
76 See, e.g., Pena v. Sita World Travel, Inc., 88 Cal. App. 3d 642, 644, 152
Cal. Rptr. 17, 18 (1978); Castaldo v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel, 376 A.2d 88,
90-91 (Del. 1977); Immergluck v. Ridgeview House, Inc., 53 IIl. App. 3d 472,
473, 368 N.E.2d 803, 804 (1977); Hoven v. Kelble, 79 Wis. 2d 444, 463-64, 256
N.W.2d 379, 388-89 (1977); Note, Application of Strict Liability to Repairers:
A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865,
866 n.9 (1977) ("With no authority on the subject of strict liability to repairers, the
[California] courts have created a 'Catch-22' whereby they will not act because
they have not previously acted and by not previously acting, they cannot so act in
the future.").
77 Greenfield, supra note 4, at 695-96 (including strict liability costs in the
costs of products and services makes consumers pay the actual cost in one lump
sum instead of risking a debilitating cost at a later date); Note, Application of
Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the Face of
Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865, 881 (1977) (because repairers compete with
sellers of new products and because strict liability applies to the latter, it should
apply to the former; otherwise, the consumer's choice to repair is penalized.); 4
N.M. L. Rv. 271, 280 n.28 (1974) (market distortions may occur if the initial
price does not reflect the social costs).
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buyer's consumption of the service. Examples of such suppliers
include beauty parlor operators who use defective hair treatment
products 78 and product repairers who supply defective replacement
parts.7 9 Restaurant operators, now considered to be sellers of food
and drink,8 0 earlier would have fallen into this category.
Nonsale suppliers are those who provide products to be used
only temporarily by the buyer while he avails himself of the sup-
plier's primary products or services. If, as is fairly typical, the
buyer uses the product on the supplier's business premises, the cases
involving these suppliers may be included under the heading of
"premises liability." 81 Examples of such suppliers include super-
market operators who provide defective shopping carts 82 and "pick
them yourself" orchard operators who supply unsafe ladders.
8
3
A particular commercial enterprise may be categorized under
both the "sale-service hybrid" and the "nonsale supplier" headings,
depending on which aspect of the enterprise is claimed to be de-
fective. For example, a beauty parlor operator would be cate-
gorized as a supplier of a sale-service hybrid with respect to the
hair treatment products used on customers, but would be con-
sidered a nonsale supplier of the chairs used in the waiting room.
Indeed, that same person would be treated as a supplier of pure
services regarding the haircuts given to customers, and would be
a retail seller of the take-home beauty aids offered for sale.84
7
8 See, e.g., Epstein v. Giannattasio, 25 Conn. Supp. 109, 197 A.2d 342 (C.P.
1963); Elliott v. Lachance, 109 N.H. 481, 256 A.2d 153 (1969); Newmark v.
Gimbels, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969); Jerry v. Borden Co., 45 A.D.2d
344, 358 N.Y.S.2d 426 (1974).
79 See, e.g., Young v. Aro Corp., 36 Cal. App. 3d 240, 111 Cal. Rptr. 535
(1973); Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578
(1976).
80 See notes 57-59 supra & accompanying text.
81 See, e.g., Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390
(1969) (bathmat in defendant's hotel); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49
Ill. App. 3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502 (1977) (shopping cart in supermarket); Ryan v.
Robeson's, Inc., 113 IM. App. 2d 416, 251 N.E.2d 545 (1969) (plate glass door in
defendant's store); Shafer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 18 Wash. App. 816, 572 P.2d
737, rev'd, 91 Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233 (1978) (wine glass in restaurant).
82 See, e.g., Safeway Stores, Inc. v. Nest-Kart, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550, 579 P.2d
441 (1978); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 480, 364
N.E.2d 502 (1977).
s3 See, e.g., Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 753 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1978).
84 Many of these products liability cases fit into more than one category.
Probably the clearest examples are the cases involving transfused blood con-
taminated with hepatitis virus. Typically, the defendant is the hospital performing
the transfusion or the blood bank supplying the blood. Although the transaction
could be characterized as the sale of a product, those courts wishing to avoid
imposition of strict liability have focused on the service element and minimized the
sale aspect. See, e.g., Perlmutter v. Beth David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d
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1. Commercial Sellers of Used Products
Until fairly recently, strict liability applied only to commer-
cial sellers of new products and did not extend to used-products
sellers.8 5 Although some courts have steadfastly refused to extend
the boundaries, 6 others, mostly in cases involving the commercial
sale of used motor vehicles or other heavy equipment, have begun
to impose strict liability on these sellers.8 7 Courts and commenta-
tors supporting this extension of the boundaries have advanced four
justifications: (1) commercial sellers profit from their activities and
should pay when products prove defective; 88 (2) strict liability
causes defect-related accident costs to be treated as costs of doing
business and thereby spreads those costs among consumers of used
products; 89 (3) according to section 402A of the Restatement of
Torts, Second, strict liability applies to any person engaged in the
792 (1954) (breach of warranty). But see Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hosp., 47 II. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1960) (sale). See also notes 105-17 infra
& accompanying text. Much the same reaction has occurred in cases in which
hospitals supply surgical equipment. See, e.g., Silverhart v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20
Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971). And the same phenomenon is
evident in cases involving installers who supply both parts and services; courts
reluctant to impose strict liability isolate the service element and play down the
sale. See, e.g., Delta Ref. Co. v. Procon, Inc., 552 S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1976).
85 See, e.g., Kilborn v. Henderson, 37 Ala. App. 173, 65 So. 2d 533 (1953);
Rix v. Reeves, 23 Ariz. App. 243, 532 P.2d 185 (1975); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner
Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877 (Tex. Civ. App. 1973); Smith v. Mooers, 206 Va.
307, 142 S.E.2d 473 (1965). See generally Comment, Strict Products Liability for
Used Car Dealers, 63 Ky. L.J. 826 (1975); Comment, The Silent Promises Seldom
Made: Implied Warranty in the Sale of Second-Hand Goods, 17 MERcER L. REV.
455 (1966); Note, Turner v. Int'l Harvester Co.: Strictly Speaking, Can Section
402(A) Be Extended to Hold Used Car Dealers Liable in Tort?, 21 S.D. L. REv. 468
(1976); Note, Cornelius v. Bay Motors Inc.: Strict Liability and the Used Car
Dealer, 8 WmLA-vmTTE L.J. 94 (1972).
86 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 III. App. 3d 690, 307
N.E.2d 729 (1974), re'd, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975) (car); Brigham
v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 118 N.H. 590, 392 A.2d 130 (1978) (car); Mid Continent
Aircraft Corp. v. Curry County Spraying Serv., Inc., 553 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1977), modified, 572 S.W.2d 308 (Tex. 1978) (airplane).
87 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 II. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d
785 (1975) (car); Realmuto v. Straub Motors, Inc., 65 N.J. 336, 322 A.2d 440
(1974) (car); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975)
(bricks); McLain v. Hodge, 474 S.W.2d 772 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (gun).
88 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 IlI. 2d 17, 20, 329
N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975) (quoting Suvada v. White Motor Co., 32 Ill. 2d 612,
619, 210 N.E.2d 182, 186 (1965)); Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 17
Ill. App. 3d 690, 693, 307 N.E.2d 729, 731 (1974), rev'd, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d
785 (1975).
89 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 698,
307 N.E.2d 729, 734 (1974), revd, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975); Turner
v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 289, 336 A.2d 62, 69 (Law
Div. 1975).
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business of selling products for use or consumption; 90 and (4) strict
liability is necessary for the safety of the general public.9 ' Some
courts and commentators have recognized the illogic of holding les-
sors strictly liable for defects while not holding used-products
sellers to the same standard because most leased products are neces-
sarily used products.
92
Courts that have refused to extend strict liability to commer-
cial sellers of used products have done so essentially on doctrinal
grounds. The early strict liability cases involved implied war-
ranties of merchantability, which the courts were unwilling to
extend to used products.9 3 Moreover, some of these cases reflected
a judicial willingness to give effect to "as is" disclaimers in contracts
of sale.94 In more recent decisions, some courts have declined to
impose strict liability on used-products sellers on the ground that
the transactions were isolated sales.95 Other courts have relied on
the lack of precedent.9 6  Finally, one influential court refused to
extend strict liability to retail sellers of used automobiles because
they have no rights of indemnity against manufacturers and thus
cannot shift the losses to the parties who created the risks.
9 7
2. Suppliers of Sale-Service Hybrids
Whether these suppliers are subject to strict liability appears to
turn on the relative importance of the product component in the
90 See, e.g., Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., 265 Or. 259, 272 n.6, 509 P.2d 529,
535 n.6 (1973); Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 306 (Tex. Civ. App.
1975).
91 See, e.g., Turner v. International Harvester Co., 133 N.J. Super. 277, 289,
336 A.2d 62, 69 (Law Div. 1975); Metzger, Products Liability and the Seller of
Used Goods, 15 Am. Bus. L.J. 159, 168-69 (1977).
92 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 17 Ill. App. 3d 690, 696-
97, 307 N.E.2d 729, 733 (1974), rev'd, 61 Ill. 2d 17, 329 N.E.2d 785 (1975);
Hovenden v. Tenbush, 529 S.W.2d 302, 310 (Tex. Civ. App. 1975); 7 Loy. CM
L.J. 159, 189 (1976).
93 See authorities cited in note 85 supra.
04 See, e.g., Yanish v. Fernandez, 156 Colo. 225, 228, 397 P.2d 881, 882
(1965); Chaq Oil Co. v. Gardner Mach. Corp., 500 S.W.2d 877, 878 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1973) (implied warranty of merchantability not applicable in sale of used
crawler-tractor when buyer knows of its used character).
95 See, e.g., Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1376, 1377 (W.D. Pa.
1977) (private sale); Siemen v. Alden, 34 Il1. App. 3d 961, 963, 341 N.E.2d 713,
715 (1975) (occasional sale); Stapinski v. Walsh Constr. Co., 383 N.E.2d 473, 476
(Ind. Ct. App. 1978) (private sale).
9 6 See, e.g., Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 III. 2d 17, 19, 329
N.E.2d 785, 787 (1975); Pridgett v. Jackson Iron & Metal Co., 253 So. 2d 837,
840 (Miss. 1971); Brigham v. Hudson Motors, Inc., 118 N.H. 590, 597, 392 A.2d
130, 135 (1978).
97 Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 II. 2d 17, 18-19, 329 N.E.2d
785, 786-87 (1975).
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overall transaction.9" Some courts ask whether the "essence of the
transaction" is sale or service; 99 others ask whether the defendant
is engaged in the business of selling or supplying the product in
question; 100 and still others ask whether the defendant may be
equated with a manufacturer and thereby avoid the difficult ques-
tion whether strict products liability should be extended to sup-
pliers of sale-service hybrids.',"
An influential consideration is whether the defendant is a
professional. In Magrine v. Krasnica,10 2 an allegedly defective
hypodermic needle broke in a patient's jaw. The Supreme Court
of New Jersey, refusing to impose strict liability on the dentist,
adopted a lower court opinion characterizing the transaction as
essentially the provision of services.' 03 The lower court's opinion
left little doubt that the defendant's status as a professional was
determinative. 104 Commentators have argued that the principles
of strict liability should apply in these sale-service hybrid cases
98 See, e.g., Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297, 300 (D. Vt.
1970) (administering anesthesia primarily involves rendering a service); Silverhart
v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 1026-28, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187, 190-91
(1971) (service, not sale, is essence of hospital-patient relationship); Hansen v.
Mercy Hosp., 570 P.2d 1309, 1310 (Colo. Ct. App.), aff'd sub nom. Belle Bonfils
Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978) (en banc) (product
aspect predominates when blood bank performs transfusion); Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 104-05, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954) (service aspect
predominates when hospital performs transfusion).
99 See, e.g., Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 235, 227 A.2d 539, 543
(Law Div. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241
A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969)
(professional service is essence of dentist-patient relationship); Perlmutter v. Beth
David Hosp., 308 N.Y. 100, 104-05, 123 N.E.2d 792, 794 (1954) (service is essence
of hospital-patient relationship); Gardner v. McDonald, [1975-1977] PRow. Lr.a.
REP. (CCH) f 8053 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1977) (performing a silicone implant is
essentially a service transaction).
100 See, e.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12, 16 n.5 (5th
Cir. 1972) (alternative holding) (hospital is not in the business of selling intracath
needles); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 69 Ill. App. 3d 1, 6, 386 N.E.2d
1126, 1130 (1978) (liability imposed on sellers); Parker v. Warren, 503 S.W.2d
938, 945 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1973) (strict liability imposed only on those who sold
the hazardous product).
101 See, e.g., Young v. Aro Corp., 36 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246, 111 Cal. Rptr.
535, 538 (1973) (repairer also manufactured product); Hamilton Fixture Co. v.
Anderson, 285 So. 2d 744, 747 (Miss. 1973) (air conditioning installation charac-
terized as the "finished product" of the installation contractor).
102 94 N.J. Super. 228, 235, 227 A.2d 539, 543 (Law Div. 1967), aff'd sub
nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637 (App. Div. 1968),
aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
103 Magrine v. Krasnica, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
104 See Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 235, 227 A.2d 539, 543 (Law
Div. 1967), aff'd sub noa. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637
(App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969).
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regardless of the defendant's professional character. 0 5  Courts,
however, have been unwilling to apply strict liability in sale-service
hybrid cases involving professionals, 106 except in cases in which a
hospital or blood bank supplied contaminated blood.107
Courts have been more willing to impose strict liability on
nonprofessional providers of services,:es as long as a product-sale
component can be identified.0 9  In Newmark v. Gimbel's, Inc.,110
a well-known decision involving an allegedly defective hair treat-
ment product used on a beauty parlor customer, the Supreme Court
of New Jersey reversed the trial court's refusal to give a strict lia-
bility instruction to the jury. The court likened the defendant's
position to that of a retailer "'. and distinguished Magrine on
several grounds, among them the following: that the beauty parlor
operator was a nonprofessional offering a mechanical and routine
service; that he advertised for customers; and that he charged cus-
105 See generally Baldwin, supra note 72 (calling for application of strict lia-
bility to all services); Franklin, supra note 4 (calling for imposition of strict liability
on blood banks, hospitals, and doctors that supply contaminated blood); Reynolds,
supra note 74 (concluding that strict liability will probably be extended to services);
Note, Products and the Professional: Strict Liability in the Sales-Service Hybrid
Transaction, 24 HAsTINGS L.J. 111 (1972) (concluding that medical professionals
should be subject to strict liability). But see Sales, supra note 65, at 27 (no strict
liability for professional sale-service hybrids); Weist, Pricing Bad Blood: Reassessing
Liability for Post-Transfusion Hepatitis, 15 HILv. J. LEGIS. 557 (1978) (negligence-
based liability is best regulatory tool for blood suppliers).
106 See, e.g., Vergott v. Deseret Pharmaceutical Co., 463 F.2d 12 (5th Cir.
1972); Mauran v. Mary Fletcher Hosp., 318 F. Supp. 297 (D. Vt. 1970); Silverhart
v. Mount Zion Hosp., 20 Cal. App. 3d 1022, 98 Cal. Rptr. 187 (1971); Carmichael
v. Reitz, 17 Cal. App. 3d 958, 95 Cal. Rptr. 381 (1971); Iannucci v. Yonkers Gen's
Hosp., 427 S.W.2d 104 (Tex. Ct. App. 1968); Lynk v. St. Joseph's Hosp., [1978-
1979] Pnon. LIAR. REP. (CCH) It 8357 (Wis. Ct. App. 1978). Courts are reluctant
to impose strict liability on professionals even when a substantial product component
is involved. See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 109
Cal. Rptr. 132 (1973); Martin v. Southern Baptist Hosp., 352 So. 2d 351 (La. Ct.
App. 1977); Gardner v. McDonald, [1975-1977] PROD. LIAB. REP. [CCH] It8053
(Tenn. Ct App. 1977); Barbee v. Rogers, 425 S.W.2d 342 (Tex. 1968).
107 See, e.g., Hansen v. Mercy Hosp., 570 P.2d 1309 (Colo. Ct. App.), aff'd
sub nom. Belle Bonfils Memorial Blood Bank v. Hansen, 579 P.2d 1158 (Colo. 1978)
(en banc); Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc., 185 So. 2d 749 (Fla. Dist. Ct
App.), aff'd as modified, 196 So. 2d 115 (Fla. 1967); Cunningham v. MacNeal
Memorial Hosp., 47 Ill. 2d 443, 266 N.E.2d 897 (1970).
108 See, e.g., Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Burlington N., Inc., 67 I1. App. 3d 928,
385 N.E.2d 937 (1978) (railroad car rebuilder); Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co.,
39 111. App. 3d 155, 349 N.E.2d 578 (1976) (tire repairer); State Stove Mfg. Co.
v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss. 1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967) (con-
struction and plumbing contractor); Newmark v. Gimble's, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 258
A.2d 697 (1969) (beautician).
10 9 See Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation, Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975)
(airplane repairer not strictly liable when no product-sale component involved).
110 54 N.J. 585, 258 A.2d 697 (1969).
311 See id. at 600, 258 A.2d at 704.
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tomers directly for the products consumed in the course of treat-
ment.112
Another type of sale-service hybrid involves repairers, for they
may be viewed as placing a repaired product into commerce,
whether or not they actually supply any parts. Repairers who
furnish no product in the course of their work have been treated
as providers of service-liable only if found negligent."3 Some
courts, however, have held repairers who supply allegedly defective
replacement parts strictly liable for harm caused by product
defects.114 Similarly, strict liability has been applied to product
installers 115 and rebuilders." 6  In general, commentators have fa-
vored these extensions of the boundaries of strict products
liability. 1
17
3. Nonsale Suppliers
Nonsale suppliers may conveniently be divided into two sub-
categories: 118 those who charge their customers specifically and
112 Id. at 596, 258 A.2d at 697.
13 See, e.g., Lemley v. J & B Tire Co., 426 F. Supp. 1378 (W.D. Pa. 1977)
(tire repairer; defect in installation, not in product); Hoffman v. Simplot Aviation,
Inc., 97 Idaho 32, 539 P.2d 584 (1975) (airplane repair involved service trans-
action). See also Codekas v. Dyna-Lift Co., 48 Cal. App. 3d 20, 121 Cal. Rptr.
121 (1975).
114 See, e.g., Nowakowski v. Hoppe Tire Co., 39 IMI. App. 3d 155, 162, 349
N.E.2d 578, 584-85 (1976).
15 See, e.g., Aced v. Hobbs-Sesack Plumbing Co., 55 Cal. 2d 573, 350 P.2d
897, 12 Cal. Rptr. 257 (1961); Brannon v. Southern Ill. Hosp. Corp., 69 Ill. App.
3d 1, 386 N.E.2d 1126 (1978); O'Laughlin v. Minnesota Natural Gas Co., 253
N.W.2d 826 (Minn. 1977); State Stove Mfg. Co. v. Hodges, 189 So. 2d 113 (Miss.
1966), cert. denied, 386 U.S. 912 (1967); Delta Ref. Co. v. Procon, Inc., 552
S.W.2d 387 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1976). But see Hoover v. Montgomery Ward & Co.,
270 Or. 461, 528 P.2d 76 (1974) (negligent installation of nondefective product
does not give rise to strict liability).
116 See, e.g., Menacho v. Adamson United Co., 420 F. Supp. 128 (D.N.J.
1976) (dictum); Toledo, P. & W.R.R. v. Burlington N., Inc., [1978-19791 PnoD.
Lrn. RsP. (CCH) ff8395 (Ill. Ct. App. 1978).
117 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 72; Reynolds, supra note 74; Comment,
Application of Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for Legislative Action in the
Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865 (1977). But see Sales, supra note 65.
118 Another, less practically significant, category of nonsale suppliers consists
of manufacturers who supply their own products for the "in house" use of their
employees. For example, in Winkler v. Hyster, 54 Ill. App. 3d 282, 369 N.E.2d
606 (1977), the plaintiff was employed by the defendant, who manufactured fork-
lifts for sale to the public. The manufacturer used some of its forklifts in its own
factory operations, and the plaintiff was injured when cargo fell from one such lift.
The court refused to impose strict liability on the ground that the product had not
been placed "in the stream of commerce." Id. at 287, 369 N.E.2d at 610. Contra,
[Vol. 128:1036
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
directly for the use of the product provided, 119 and those who treat
the costs of furnishing the product as part of their overhead, to be
reflected in the prices they charge for their other products and
services.120  Several courts have imposed strict products liability on
nonsale suppliers in the first subcategory.' 21 For example, the
California Court of Appeal imposed strict liability on the operator
of a laundromat for injuries to a customer caused by an alleged
design defect in one of the laundromat's washing machines.1
22
Describing the laundromat operator as a "licensor of personal prop-
erty,'"13 the court concluded that such suppliers "'are an integral
part of the overall .. .marketing enterprise that should bear the
cost of injuries resulting from defective products.' "'2
Compared with the preceding group, nonsale suppliers in the
second subcategory are involved in many more reported cases across
a broader range of fact patterns. 25  The comparative abundance
and variety of these decisions stem in part from the fact that many
commercial enterprises furnish products for the temporary use and
convenience of their customers. Examples include supermarkets
Douglas v. E. & J. Gallo Winery, 69 Cal. App. 3d 103, 137 Cal. Rptr. 797 (1977)
(court allowed employee's products liability suit against employer that manufac-
tured, for sale to general public, the product causing the injury).
119 Nonsale supplier cases in which the defendant charged the plaintiff specif-
ically for use of the product that caused the injury become very similar to the
products lessor cases considered earlier. See notes 35-44 supra & accompanying text.
The main difference between the two are the relative informality and short duration
of contracts between plaintiffs and defendants in nonsale supplier cases, and the
plaintiff's use, in the typical nonsale supplier case, of the product on the defendant's
business premises. An example of an activity that could be placed in either
category is the renting of golf carts by golf course operators. Compare Sipari v.
Villa Olivia Country Club, 63 Ill. App. 3d 985, 380 N.E.2d 819 (1978) (strict
liability applied), with Katz v. Slade, 460 S.V.2d 608 (Mo. 1970) (strict liability
not applied).
120These cases are the ones most likely to be categorized as involving
"premises liability." See note 81 supra & accompanying text.
121 See, e.g., Thomas v. General Motors, 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 91 Cal. Rptr.
301 (1970) (laundromat operator); Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal.
Rptr. 420 (1970) (laundromat operator); Sipari v. Villa Olivia Country Club, 63
Ill. App. 3d 985, 380 N.E.2d 819 (1978) (golf course operator). But see
Sergermeister v. Recreation Corp. of America, 314 So. 2d 626 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1975) (amusement park ride); Shaw v. Fairyland at Harvey's, Inc., 26 A.D.2d
576, 271 N.Y.S.2d 70 (1966) (ferris wheel).
122 Garcia v. Halsett, 3 Cal. App. 3d 319, 82 Cal. Rptr. 420 (1970).
123 Id. at 324, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 422.
124 Id. at 325, 82 Cal. Rptr. at 423 (quoting Vandermark v. Ford Motor Co.,
61 Cal. 2d 256, 262, 391 P.2d 168, 171, 37 Cal. Rptr. 896, 899 (1964)).
22Z See cases cited in notes 129 & 130 infra.
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that provide shopping carts 126 and hotels that supply bathmats in
their bathrooms. 1
27
Although commentators have urged extension of the bound-
aries of strict products liability to include nonsale suppliers in the
second subcategory, 28 courts have been reluctant to impose strict
liability on this group: a number of courts have done so,' 2 9 but
about an equal number have declined.130 Many of these refusals
reflect in part an unwillingness to overturn the rules limiting the
liability of commercial enterprises for harm suffered by persons
coming onto business premises. The plaintiffs in these nonsale
supplier cases are typically business invitees to whom the invitor
owes a duty of care. 3 1 In such cases, proof of negligence has
traditionally been a prerequisite to invitor liability. 32  Moreover,
because these nonsale suppliers do not charge their customers di-
rectly for the products that cause the accidents, market deterrence
would be achieved only imperfectly by imposing strict liability.
33
Finally, an indemnity action by a supplier against the original
126 See, e.g., Safeway Stores v. Nest Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146
Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 480,
364 N.E.2d 502 (1977).
127See, e.g., Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390
(1969).
128 See, e.g., Love, Landlord's Liability for Defective Premises: Caveat Lessee,
Negligence, or Strict Liability?, 1975 Wis. L. REv. 19; Note, Faichoury v. Magner:
From Caveat Emptor to Caveat Lessor-Strict Liability and the Landlord, 9 CAr_
W. L. REv. 547 (1973); Note, Products Liability at the Threshold of the Landlord-
Lessor, 21 HAsTNGS L.J. 458 (1970).
129 See, e.g., Schnitzer v. Nixon, 439 F.2d 940 (4th Cir. 1971); Safeway Stores
v. Nest Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 579 P.2d 441, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550 (1978) (shopping
carts); Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233 (1978)
(wine glass in restaurant); Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 565 S.W.2d
753 (Mo. Ct. App. 1978) (ladder in orchard).
130 See, e.g., Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 399 (1969)
(hotel bathmat); Keen v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 480, 364
N.E.2d 502 (1977) (shopping cart); Ryan v. Robeson's, Inc., 113 Ill. App. 2d
416, 251 N.E.2d 545 (1969) (glass door in store); Lewis v. Big Powderhorn Mt.
Ski Corp., 69 Mich. App. 437, 245 N.W.2d 81 (1976) (ski resorts rope tow);
Kennedy v. Providence Hockey Club, Inc., 376 A.2d 329 (R.L 1977) (spectator
injured in hockey game by flying puck).
131 See cases cited in notes 126, 127, & 129 supra. See also RESTATEMENT
(ScoD) oF ToRTs § 343 (1965).
132The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 343 (1965) imposes the duty
of "reasonable care" on the invitor, and courts have refused to impose strict liability.
See, e.g., Wagner v. Coronet Hotel, 10 Ariz. App. 296, 458 P.2d 390 (1969);
Keen v. Dominicek's Finer Foods, Inc., 49 Ill. App. 3d 480, 364 N.E.2d 502 (1977).
133For example, if a restaurant is held strictly liable when a chair collapses,
injuring a customer, the prices the restaurant charges for its meals will presumably
reflect the accident costs on a pro rata basis. Thus, a customer who orders barley
soup will pay less "chair risk tax" than one who orders the more expensive
lobster bisque, although both sit for the same length of time in the chairs provided
by the restaurant.
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manufacturer may not be available as a practical matter because the
product in question is relatively old and has been used by many
different persons.1' Thus, these suppliers will have difficulty
shifting the loss to the parties who created (and who can better
avoid) the risk.3 5
II. IMPLICATIONS OF THE THEORY OF THE SECOND BEST IN
RESOLVING BOUNDARY DISPUTES
A. The General Relevance of Second Best Theory to
Products Liability
The Theory of the Second Best may be used to define the ap-
propriate reach of strict products liability in the areas of consensus
and controversy outlined above. The theory is primarily concerned
with the effects upon allocative efficiency of boundary extensions
that distinguish between activities that are, from the consumer's
viewpoint, substantially substitutable. In order to appreciate the
theory's relevance to products liability boundary disputes, it will be
helpful to examine its general contours and review its applications
in other legal areas.
As explained earlier, optimally efficient resource allocation is
achieved when it is impossible for any individual to gain by further
exchange without causing harm to another individual. 36 In any
given situation, a finite number of identifiable conditions, relating
to the satisfaction of consumer preferences and the allocation of in-
puts and outputs among producers, must be met in order to achieve
optimal efficiency. 37 Stated most generally, the Theory of the
Second Best considers the possible impact of alternative courses of
134 The restaurant's wine glass in Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d
295, 588 P.2d 233 (1978), for example, probably had been used and washed many
times prior to the time it broke and injured the plaintiff. Given the requirement
that the restaurant operator establish that the glass was defective when it left the
manufacturer's hands, an indemnity action was unlikely to succeed. See note 167
infra & accompanying text.
135 Cf. Peterson v. Lou Bachrodt Chevrolet Co., 61 Ill. 2d 17, 18-19, 329
N.E.2d 785, 786-87 (1975) (court refused to impose strict liability on used-
products seller because seller had no right of indemnification against manufacturer).
136 See note 20 supra & accompanying text.
137 These conditions are: (1) "the marginal rate of substitution between any
two commodities must be the same for any two consumers"; (2) "the marginal
rate of technical substitution between any two inputs must be the same for any
pair of producers"; and (3) "the marginal rate of substitution between any two
commodities must be the same as the marginal rate of product transformation
between these two commodities for any producer." E. MASFImLD, supra note 2,
at 444-45.
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action when all of these conditions cannot be fulfilled.138 Under
these circumstances, will efficiency necessarily be increased by satis-
fying those conditions that can be satisfied? Rejecting the intuitive
wisdom of "half a loaf is better than none," the Theory of the
Second Best answers this question in the negative. If the "first best"
position of satisfying all of the requirements for optimally efficient
resource allocation cannot (or for some overriding policy reason
should not) be reached, the "second best" position may be to fulfill
fewer than all, or even none, of the remaining satisfiable condi-
tions. 3 9 The theory does not insist that allocative efficiency is
always an overriding social objective. It simply advises against
proceeding on the assumption that efficiency will be enhanced by
satisfying as many as possible (but less than all) of the conditions
necessary to achieve optimal efficiency.
To date, the implications of Second Best Theory in legal
analysis have been recognized primarily by writers in the fields of
antitrust and economic regulation. 40 Although commentators have
questioned the practical utility of the theory in those contexts,' 41 an
138 See generally authorities cited in note 2 supra.
139 See authorities cited in note 2 supra & text accompanying notes 5-7 supra.
140 See, e.g., W. BAUMOL, WELFARE EcoNOuIcs AND THE THEoRY OF THE
STATE 30 (2d ed. 1965); R. Boar, THE ANnTTsT PMARAox 113-14 (1978);
A. KA.HN, TnE EcoNomics OF REGULATrON 69-70, 241-43 (1970); R. POSNER,
supra note 2, at 202-03 n.1; E. SnNGEa, ANnTTRuST EcoNoncs: SELECTED LEGAL
CASES Ai-m EcoNOanc MoDELs 21-22 (1968); L. SuiUV.r, HANUBooEc OF THE
LAw OF ANTITRUST 4-5 (1977); Markovits, A Basic Structure for Microeconomic
Policy Analysis in Our Worse-Than-Second-Best World: A Proposal and Related
Critique of the Chicago Approach to the Study of Law and Economics, 1975 Wis.
L. REv. 950; Sullivan, Book Review, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 1214, 1219-20 (1975);
Williamson, Assessing Vertical Market Restrictions: Antitrust Ramifications of the
Transaction Cost Approach, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 953, 986-88 (1979).
141 Applied on an economy-wide, or global, scale, the theory in its pure form
counsels against any regulatory action on the ground that all the conditions of
perfect resource allocation can never be achieved. See generally W. BAUMoL,
supra note 140, at 30; R. Boax, supra note 140, at 114; Sullivan, supra note 140,
at 4-5. The present context of products liability is sufficiently different from these
other legal areas to render Second Best Theory more useful here. In antitrust, for
example, Congress has mandated that monopolizing is a criminal offense, 15 U.S.C.
§2 (1976); the courts are not free to decide independently whether specific
illegal monopolies should or should not be eliminated. In products liability, no
comparable congressional mandate exists. Moreover, allocative efficiency is an
important economic objective of antitrust enforcement. Thus, in order to use
Second Best analysis in antitrust cases, courts would be required to determine a
range of potential results of regulation, including not just substitution effects, but
also the effects of product complements, inputs, and outputs. See R. Bowx, supra
note 140, at 4-5. In the context of products liability, inquiry may more legitimately
be limited to substitution effects, due to the more limited relevance of allocative
efficiency: the objective of strict products liability is not to achieve an efficient
allocation of resources as an end in itself, but to cause the prices of products to
reflect their defect-related accident costs as a means of reducing those costs.
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examination of the theory's importance there will help to make
dear its relevance in the present, somewhat different, area of re-
solving products liability boundary disputes. One writer, discussing
in general terms Second Best Theory in the context of antitrust law,
employs the following hypothetical example: 142
[L]eather buttons are monopolized and sell at a price of
10, even though the cost of production is only 60. The
nearest substitute for leather buttons, plastic buttons, sell
for 80 each.' 43] As a result of the monopolization of
leather buttons, some people substitute plastic buttons for
them, but if the price of a plastic button is equal to its
cost, this substitution is inefficient. A product that costs
8¢ to produce is being purchased in place of one that costs
only 60 to produce. Resources are being diverted from
the production of a less costly method of satisfying con-
sumer wants to the production of a more costly one. But
suppose now that plastic buttons are not being sold at a
price equal to cost. They are being sold at 80, a monopoly
price, but cost only 5# to produce. With leather buttons
being sold at the monopoly price of 10, people will buy
more plastic buttons despite their monopoly price, and this
is efficient since plastic buttons cost less to produce. If the
monopoly of leather buttons is terminated, price will de-
cline to the competitive level, 60, and people will begin to
substitute leather for plastic buttons. Termination of the
leather button monopoly confronts the consumer with a
false alternative. Given the monopoly of plastic buttons,
the "second best" solution to the problem of economizing
on resource use is a monopoly of leather buttons; first best,
of course, would be no monopolies.['"]
The usefulness of Second Best Theory in the present analysis
can best be understood by comparing the situation confronting
142 R. Posur, EcoNoMIc ANALYSis OF LAw § 6.7, at 112-13 (1st ed. 1973).
143 Assuming that plastic buttons are competitively priced, the monopoly in
the leather button industry causes overconsumption of plastic buttons and under-
consumption of leather buttons, relative to the levels of consumption that would
occur in a competitive market. Thus, a necessary condition to the efficient allocation
of resources-that leather buttons as well as plastic buttons be competitively
priced-is not satisfied. In technical terms, the marginal rate of substitution for
consumption of plastic and leather buttons does not equal the marginal rate of
transformation for production of that pair of commodities. See generally E.
MANsFur, supra note 2, at 445-46.
144 In the context of strict products liability, the emphasis is not on which
products are more costly to produce, but on which are more costly to consume-
that is, which generate more defect-related accident costs. See note 7 supra & note
165 infra.
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government officials in enforcing the antitrust laws with that con-
fronting courts in products liability cases. In the antitrust context,
monopolies cause the prices of certain products and services to be
higher than they should be, that is, higher than they would be in a
free market. In the products liability context, the inability of con-
sumers effectively to assess defect-related accident costs causes the
prices of certain products and services to be lower than they should
be, that is, lower than they would be if suppliers paid the accident
costs caused by their defective products. 145 Antitrust laws and strict
products liability aim at eliminating these pricing breakdowns: the
former attempt to ensure that prices do not rise above competitive
market levels; the latter is intended to produce prices of products
and services adequately reflecting their accident costs. In effect,
antitrust regulations seek to remove the equivalent of an unfair,
inefficient, privately imposed products tax; strict products liability,
also in the interests of fairness and efficiency, seeks to impose the
equivalent of a public "risk tax" on products based on their relative
defect-related risks.1 6
Second Best Theory becomes relevant in the antitrust field due
to the impossibility of eliminating all monopolies via regulation.
In the area of strict products liability, the theory's usefulness arises
due to the impossibility of effectively reaching all suppliers of
products and services via strict products liability. The same basic
question is posed in both contexts: Will allocative efficiency be
enhanced by satisfying those conditions that can be satisfied-that is,
by using antitrust regulation and strict liability, respectively, to
reach those market activities that can be reached? The answer sug-
gested in both areas by Second Best Theory, at least when the reach-
able and unreachable activities are substantially substitutable, is
"probably not." When the two activities are substitutable, con-
sumers at the margin will turn to those suppliers whose products
are comparatively underpriced because they are not within the
limited reach of regulation; thus, market distortions will occur in
the form of overconsumption of those underpriced products. 147
145 See notes 3-4 supra & accompanying text.
146 Admittedly, both antitrust and strict products liability have objectives other
than the attainment of allocative efficiency, but that shared aim is of greatest rel-
evance in the present analysis.
Among the noneconomic goals of antitrust are decentralizing decisionmaling
power and widening opportunities for individuals to engage as entrepreneurs in
competitive enterprises. See generally L. Surj.mvA, supra note 140, at 11-13.
For a summary of the noneconomic objectives of products liability, see text ac-
companying notes 10-19 supra.
147The use here of the word "underpriced" is not technically accurate in the
area of antitrust. The competitively priced plastic buttons in the earlier example,
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The importance of Second Best Theory to disputes about the
boundaries of strict products liability should now be dear. Areas
of consensus exist regarding categories of suppliers of products and
services to be included within or excluded from the boundaries. 14
Some of the excluded categories-those involving noncommercial
suppliers of products and services-are unreachable, in any prac-
tical sense. Between these areas of consensus are areas in which the
exact placement of the boundaries is still disputed.149 To date,
policy analyses in these areas of controversy have tended to focus on
the objectives of cost spreading and deterrence and to urge that
strict liability be imposed on all risky commercial activities. 5
0
Second Best Theory suggests an additional policy consideration.
Even if a particular commercial activity can be reached by a system
of strict products liability, allocative efficiency may not be increased,
and may in fact be diminished, if consumers can substitute for that
activity a more risky 15' activity beyond the system's reach.
For example, consider the earlier illustration involving leather
and plastic buttons.152  In that example, the cost of producing
leather buttons was six cents, and the cost of plastic buttons, five
cents. The effect of eliminating a monopoly with respect to the
former but not the latter, it will be recalled, was to cause some
consumers to shift to leather buttons, the more expensive to pro-
duce, in place of plastic buttons.
In the present context, both types of buttons are assumed to
have risks of injury from product defects (bringing the total costs to
consumers to ten cents and eight cents respectively), and the costs
associated with those risks are assumed to be hidden from con-
sumers. On these assumptions, leather buttons enjoy a slight com-
see text accompanying notes 143-44 supra, were not so much "underpriced" as
they were "not overpriced." In any event, it is important to understand that in
the antitrust context it will be the products that are reached by regulation that are
overconsumed, whereas in the products liability context it will be the products that
are not reached that are overconsumed.
148 See notes 26-59 supra & accompanying text (included suppliers); notes
60-77 supra & accompanying text (excluded suppliers).
14 See notes 78-135 supra & accompanying text.
25 0 See authorities cited in notes 38, 56, 77, 105, 117, & 128 supra.
-15 It follows from the figures in note 153 infra that imposing strict liability on
only one of two perfectly substitutable products may cause a net decrease in social
welfare even if the two substitutes are equally risky.
152 See text accompanying notes 143-44 supra.
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petitive advantage over plastic buttons by reason of their escaping
four cents in accident costs, compared with three cents for the
plastic substitutes. The first best solution to the resulting marginal
overconsumption of leather buttons would be to impose a risk tax
on both types of buttons sufficient to raise the price of leather but-
tons to ten cents and that of plastic to eight cents. If plastic buttons
are for some reason the only ones that can be reached by such a tax,
however, its imposition would cause plastic buttons to be priced
higher (eight cents) than leather buttons (six cents) and would
therefore exacerbate the distortion favoring consumption of leather
buttons. In that circumstance, the second best solution would be
to decline to tax the reachable plastic buttons, for to impose such a
tax would significantly increase consumption of a substitute that is
not only more costly to produce (six cents versus five cents), but is
also accompanied by greater hidden accident costs (four cents versus
three cents). 153
1
5 3 The possibility that allocative efficiency-and therefore social welfare-will
decrease as a result of imposing strict liability on only one of two substitutable
products may be demonstrated graphically as follows:
irmuRE
MRCLP
a M[ACP
P b L
d
C
Units of P 25
Units of L 75
35 45 50 55
65 55 50 45
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Thus, allocative efficiency may be reduced as a consequence of
reaching all of the activities that strict products liability can reach.
To be sure, torts scholars do not view efficiency as an end in itself.
But when inefficiency takes the form of wastefully high accident
rates caused by overconsumption of relatively risky products and
product-related activities, efficiency should at least be a relevant, if
not a controlling, policy consideration.
B. Developing Criteria with Which to Assess the Potential
Distortion Effects of Proposed Boundary Extensions
As suggested by the foregoing analysis, the primary criterion
for assessing the potential distortion effects of any proposed exten-
FiGuRz 2
Units of P 25 35 45 50 55 65 75
Units of L 75 65 55 50 45 35 25
In each of these figures, the marginal costs curves for leather buttons (L) and
plastic buttons (P) are indicated, with the curves for P rising from left to right and
the curves for L from right to left. The horizontal axis in each figure represents
the combined consumption of P and L. It is assumed that P and L are perfect
substitutes and that the aggregate demand for P and L is constant-that is, that
consumers will buy a total of 100 units of P and L regardless of their price.
(Because P and L are perfect substitutes, their prices will be the same. This
departure from the hypothetical in the text, in which P and L were not perfect
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sion of the boundaries of strict products liability is the relative
substitutability of noncommercial-and therefore unreachable 154
activities for the commercial activity proposed to be included by
the boundary extension. The greater the substitutability, the more
significant will be the shifts in consumer demand favoring the ac-
substitutes, will simplify the following graphic demonstration. The consequences
of imposing strict liability on less-than-perfect substitutes will be considered in
note 155 infra.)
In figure 1, MRCL is the marginal real costs curve for leather buttons, and
MRCP is the marginal real costs curve for plastic buttons. The curves' point of
intersection, a, determines the proportion in which P and L are consumed if they
are accompanied by no hidden costs-that is, if their prices reflect both their costs
of production and their accident costs. In figure 1, 45 units of P and 55 units of
L are consumed at price W, at a total social cost (that is, production costs plus
accident costs) indicated by the lightly shaded area under the curve bac.
MACP is the marginal apparent costs curve for plastic buttons; it represents
productions costs but not accident costs. If only production costs are reflected in
the price of P-that is, if the difference in costs between MACP and MRCP is
hidden from consumers-a different point of intersection, e, is established. Because
P is now underpriced relative to L, consumption of P increases, and consumption of
L decreases, to the point that an equal number of each is consumed, at a total social
cost indicated by the area under the curve boec. The heavier shaded triangle
aoe represents the net increase in social costs associated with underpricing P. The
five additional plastic buttons consumed at the margin actually cost more than the
five leather buttons they replace (although their monetary price to consumers is the
same), and social welfare is correspondingly diminished.
Figure I clearly reveals how imposing strict liability under the above-
described circumstances increases social welfare: by moving the cost curve for P
up to MRCP, the appropriate equilibrium between plastic and leather buttons is
established. The intersection of costs curves moves from point e to point a, and
the wasteful costs indicated by the heavily shaded area are eliminated.
In figure 2, a marginal apparent costs curve for leather buttons (MACL) has
been added. Leather buttons are assumed to be riskier than plastic ones, so that
the vertical distance between MACL and MRCL is greater than the vertical distance
between MACP and MRCP. Assuming for the moment that both P and L escape
their hidden costs-that is, that the prices for both are equal to their apparent
costs-a new intersection, f, is established. Leather buttons thus gain a small
advantage over their plastic counterparts because they escape a bit more in the
way of hidden costs. The small, very heavily shaded area to the left of point a
in figure 2 represents the social waste generated by the overconsumption of leather
buttons. (This very heavily shaded area is smaller than the heavily shaded area
in figure 1 because L's advantage over P in figure 2 is smaller than P's advantage
over L in figure 1.)
In figure 2, the first best solution to the problem of social waste is to impose
strict liability on both P and L, moving the intersection to point a. Such a move
would establish the optimal mix between the two substitutes and eliminate the
social waste associated with point f. If this first best solution is not possible-if
for some reason leather buttons cannot be reached by strict liability-the second
best solution is not to impose strict liability just on plastic buttons. If only plastic
buttons are forced to reflect their accident costs in their price, the new point of
intersection is h, considerably to the left of point f in figure 2. At point h, the
mix between P and L shifts to 37.5-62.5, and the social waste increases by the amount
of the not-so-heavily shaded area above MRCP and below MRCL. On the
assumptions made herein, imposing strict liability only on plastic buttons actually
makes things worse than if no strict liability were imposed at all.
154 See text following note 63 supra.
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tivities excluded from strict liability. 55 Of course, even though
strict liability does not reach the excluded activities directly, it may
reach them indirectly if they depend substantially on commercially
supplied products. 56  A second criterion is therefore the extent
to which the noncommercial substitutes are reachable by strict
products liability. The greater their relative "reachability," the less
significant the shifts in demand in their direction.152
A third criterion that must be taken into account is the rela-
tive differential in defect-related risks between the commercial
activity proposed to be covered by strict products liability and the
noncommercial substitutes excluded from the boundaries. In gen-
eral, the greater the defect-related risks associated with the non-
commercial substitutes compared with those associated with the
commercial activity to be included, the greater the price advantage
enjoyed by the excluded substitutes and thus the greater the poten-
tial distortion effects. The distortion effects of primary concern
to torts scholars are those that result in increases in defect-related
55 See note 5 supra.
In terms of the behavior of individual consumers, when two products are not
highly substitutable, increasing the price of the reachable substitute, R, will cause
only a few consumers to switch to the unreachable substitute, U. Many of the
remaining consumers will simply pay R's new price, which reflects its marginal
real costs. The rest will do something else with the money that they used to
spend on R.
Although figure 2 in note 153 supra deals with perfect substitutes, it shows
that when consumers at the margin switch from buying a reachable substitute at a
price determined by its marginal apparent costs to buying an unreachable substitute
at a price determined by its marginal apparent costs, social welfare may decrease.
But figure 2 also shows that when consumers do not switch, but consume the
reachable substitute at a price determined by its real costs, this social loss is
eliminated. (In graphical terms, if consumers do not switch, the welfare loss
represented by the lightly shaded area disappears.)
Consumers who stop buying either product are not represented in figure 2,
but their behavior could be represented in an N-dimensional figure, with N equal
to the number of available substitutes. If the changes in social welfare produced
by the consumers who stop buying either product are put aside, it is clear that if
U is highly substitutable for R, the decrease in welfare caused by consumers'
switching to R is large. But when U is less substitutable, fewer consumers switch,
and the loss is smaller.
U6 For an example of an excluded activity that can be reached indirectly, see
notes 213-14 infra & accompanying text.
157 In graphical terms, the relative "reachability" of the unreachable substitute
affects the height of its marginal apparent costs curve. Because the unreachable
substitute cannot be reached directly by strict products liability, the marginal apparent
costs curve will probably remain below the marginal real costs curve; but reaching
that substitute indirectly wil raise the apparent costs curve and thus bring the curves
closer together. In figure 1 in note 153 supra, for example, the increase in social
costs represented by the heavier shaded triangle aoe will be reduced if the mar-
ginal apparent costs curve for P (MACP) is raised.
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accident costs; 1s this third criterion will be most important, there-
fore, when the risks of the excluded substitutes are greater than
the risks of the activities to be included within the boundaries of
strict products liability. In that circumstance, extending the bound-
aries may actually increase, rather than reduce, overall accident
costs. 59
A fourth, and final, criterion for assessing potential distortion
effects of boundary extensions is the relative inability of consumers
to assess for themselves the defect-related risks of the excluded,
noncommercial substitutes. As a general rule, consumers are as-
sumed to be incapable of adequately evaluating the defect-related
accident costs associated with the use and consumption of manufac-
tured products.160 The same assumption may be inappropriate,
however, in connection with some of the noncommercial alterna-
tives to which consumers are attracted at the margin.' 6 ' Even if
the risks associated with these noncommercial substitutes are rela-
tively high, the price advantage they enjoy, and hence the potential
distortion effects, will be reduced to the extent that consumers can,
and will, weigh their own, accurate risk assessments in deciding
whether to shift to those substitutes.
16 2
The foregoing criteria may be used to evaluate the potential
distortion effects of extending the boundaries of strict products
liability; it remains to consider the possible distortion effects of
refusing to extend the boundaries to include all commercial activ-
ities that are good substitutes for already included activities. Given
that including commercial activities for which noncommercial sub-
stitutes are available may create distortion effects, declining to
include commercial activities for which other commercial-and
15 8 See note 6 supra.
159 In graphical terms, the extent of the distortion, and thus the increase in
social costs, of reaching with strict liability only one of two product substitutes de-
pends in part on the relative distances between their real and apparent costs curves.
In figure 2 in note 153 supra, for example, the distortion created by reaching only P
is greater than the distortion created by reaching only L (the triangle hka to the
left of point a is larger than the triangle aoe to the right of point a) in part be-
cause the distance between MRCL and MACL is greater than the distance between
MRCP and MACP.
160 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
161 See notes 170-71 infra & accompanying text.
162 In graphical terms, to the extent that consumers can, and will, consider the
defect-related risks of the unreachable substitute in deciding which product to buy,
the marginal apparent costs curve of that substitute rises, causing a decrease in social
costs. See note 157 supra.
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presumably already included 163-substitutes exist may also produce
distortion. Clearly, the adverse effects of extending the boundaries
may not be considered significant if rejecting the extension would
generate distortion of even greater magnitude; the relevant con-
sideration is the net distortion effects of any given boundary
decision.
Expanding the analysis in this way underscores its situational
character. Rather than focus upon the policy objectives that
prompted courts to construct the system of strict products liability,
this analysis explores the implications of the practical limits of that
system's reach. In the context of any particular boundary dispute,
the question asked is not only whether the proposed extension fits
into some overall policy scheme, but also whether it fits into the
neighborhood of reachable and unreachable substitutes that im-
mediately surround it. To those accustomed to working exclu-
sively with overarching policies, this analysis may at times appear
shortsighted, if not self-contradictory. At one moment, it counsels
caution by concluding: "Just because we could go further doesn't
mean we should." At the next, it justifies boldness by asserting:
"Because we have come this far, we probably should go further."
As should be dear by now, what connects and reconciles these
positions is a concern for the distortion caused by the availability
to consumers of reachable and unreachable substitutes immediately
surrounding a proposed boundary extension,
Not surprisingly, the criteria with which to assess the potential
distortion effects of refusing to extend the boundaries of strict
products liability closely parallel the criteria already developed for
assessing the effects of boundary extensions. Again, the primary
criterion is the relative substitutability of the commercial activity
proposed to be excluded for other commercial activities already,
or likely to be, included within the boundaries. A second criterion
is the relative "reachability" of the commercial activities that are to
be excluded. To the extent that these activities would be only
partially reachable even if they were included within the bound-
163 If the other commercial substitutes are not already included within the
-boundaries, the court would have to assess the likelihood of their eventual
inclusion. This need for prediction reflects a source of difficulty in implementing
the present analysis via the incremental process of the common law. Courts
that first began to impose strict liability may have faced a bigger problem due to
the larger number of unsettled issues. To illustrate, in Larsen v. General Motors
Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968), which extended liability to automobile
manufacturers for negligently designed vehicles, the defendant argued that "[ajuto-
mobile manufacturers cannot be made a special class." Id. 504. The court agreed,
and vowed in dictum to extend the same rule to all products manufacturers.
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aries of strict liability, the potential distortion effects produced by
their exclusion will be reduced.
A third criterion is the relative differential in defect-related
risks between the commercial activity proposed to be excluded and
substitutable commercial activities already, or likely to be, included
within the boundaries. Like its counterpart above, this criterion
relates to the comparative price advantage to be enjoyed by the ex-
cluded commercial activity by reason of its exclusion. In general,
the greater the risks of the excluded activity compared with those
of the substitutable activities already included, the greater the
potential price advantage and hence the greater the possible distor-
tion from refusing to extend the strict liability boundaries. As in
the earlier analysis, the fourth and final criterion is the relative
inability of consumers to assess for themselves the defect-related
risks of the commercial activities proposed to be excluded.
Before these criteria are applied to both the areas of consensus
and the areas of continuing controversy at the boundaries of strict
products liability, a few general caveats are in order. First, these
criteria are not intended to be applied on a case-by-case basis-
they are not rules for deciding individual cases. Instead, they are
offered as part of an underlying policy analysis to aid courts and
legislatures in establishing general categories of activities included
and excluded from the domain of strict products liability. Second,
data are not presently available upon which to base scientifically
accurate applications of the criteria. The extent to which one
product or product-related activity substitutes for another, for
example, can only be surmised here. For the present, sensible as-
sumptions must suffice, although they may be rebutted if and when
data become available.
Finally, this Article addresses only one factor to consider in
setting the boundaries of strict products liability. Bases other than
the achievement of allocative efficiency-shared notions of fairness,
for example-exist for imposing strict products liability. And even
when strict liability creates distortion effects, it may nevertheless
be justified on efficiency grounds if it achieves reductions in acci-
dent costs that more than offset those distortion effects. Thus, if a
commercial enterprise is clearly a "more efficient cost minimizer,"
and if exposure to negligence-based liability is insufficient to pres-
sure that enterprise to adopt cost-effective safety procedures, 164 im-
posing strict liability may generate gains in safety that more than
164 See note 15 supra & accompanying text.
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compensate for the shift of some consumers to riskier substitutes.165
Product manufacturers, for example, represent more efficient cost
minimizers to whom this observation quite clearly applies. As
will be developed in the following section, however, imposing
165 The possibility that imposing strict liability on only one of two perfect
substitutes will produce safety gains that outweigh the resultant distortion may be
demonstrated graphically as follows:
$ b
P b~'
Units of P 25
'Units of L 75
35 45 50 55 65 75
65 55 50 45 35 25
Figure 3 is reproduced from figure 2 in note 153 supra, except for the addition
of curve MRCP', which represents the marginal real costs of producing P after the
imposition of strict liability. That MRCP' is below MRCP reflects the assumption
that imposing strict liability on P will force producers to reduce P's accident costs.
Before the imposition of strict liability, P and L were consumed in a pro-
portion represented by point f, with a corresponding total social cost equal to the
area under the curve bnjc. After the imposition of strict liability, curves MACP
and MRCP move to curve MRCP', and the proportion of P and L consumed shifts
to point h'. The total social cost associated with this point equals the area under
the curve b'h'k'c.
A comparison of the total social costs before and after the imposition of strict
liability reveals two differences: a reduction in P's accident costs (represented by
the lightly shaded area in figure 3) and a relative increase in social costs due to
overconsumption of L (represented by the heavily shaded area in figure 3). The
reduction in P's accident costs occurs across the entire range of production and
is therefore likely to exceed the loss produced at the margin by the overcon-
sumption of L. Thus, if a significant decrease in P's accident costs can be
achieved by subjecting P to strict liability, that reduction is likely to outweigh the
marginal increase in social costs caused by imposing such liability.
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strict liability on most of the commercial enterprises whose inclu-
sion within the boundaries is controversial would not produce
gains in safety of sufficient magnitude to counterbalance the result-
ing distortion.166
C. Applying the Criteria to the Areas of
General Consensus
The objective of this section is to demonstrate that the bound-
aries of the activities that are by consensus included within, or ex-
cluded from, strict products liability tend to minimize the distortion
described in this Article.
1. Manufacturers and Other Commercial Sellers
of New Products
Beyond question, the decision to impose strict liability upon
commercial sellers of new products reduces substantially the dis-
tortion effects that are of primary concern in this analysis. Gen-
erally speaking, there are two noncommercial, and therefore un-
reachable, substitutes for using and relying upon commercially
supplied new products in an industrialized society: (1) "doing it
yourself" by relying on homemade products and individual labor,
and (2) relying on older products for which the original commer-
cial sellers are no longer responsible.167 Regarding the first of these
alternatives, some shifts at the margin undoubtedly have occurred
due to the fact that do-it-yourself substitutes escape most risk
taxes (the price increases that reflect the cost of defect-related
accidents). 16 8  But because the degree of substitutability of these
166 These gains are likely to be too small because these enterprises have less
control over defect rates and are more subject to negligence-based liability than are
manufacturers. See note 248 infra & accompanying text.
167 Commercial sellers are generally held legally responsible for defects through-
out the useful lives of their products. See, e.g., Dunham v. Vaughan & Bushnell
Mfg. Co., 42 Ill. 2d 339, 342-44, 247 N.E.2d 401, 403 (1969). But courts generally
refuse to impose liability when the products in question are very old, have been
used by many persons, or have been repaired in such a way that it is difficult to
prove that the injury was caused by a defect that existed when the product left the
seller's hands. See, e.g., Knudsen v. Peoples Lumber Co., 68 Cal. App. 3d 167, 137
Cal. Rptr. 110 (1977) (opinion withdrawn from publication by order of California
Supreme Court pursuant to rule 976 of the California Rules of Court); Ford Motor
Co. v. McCamish, 559 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. App. 1977); Worrell v. Barnes, 87 Nev.
204, 484 P.2d 573 (1971). See also Barbeau v. Roddy Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 989
(6th Cir. 1970).
168 Of course, some risk taxes may not be avoided. When "do it yourselfers"
rely on manufactured components to produce their own assembled products, the
commercial sellers of those components are liable for harm proximately caused by
defects. See, e.g., Independent Nail & Packing Co. v. Mitchell, 343 F.2d 819, 823
(1st Cir. 1965). And when commercial sellers supply consumers with "assemble it
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
alternatives is generally quite low, these shifts (and thus the dis-
tortion) are probably quite small. 169 Moreover, it may reasonably
be assumed that the do-it-yourself activities to which consumers at
the margin are likely to turn are generally less risky than activities
relying upon commercially supplied new products,1'70 and that con-
sumers are generally better able to assess, and more willing to con-
sider, the risks associated with do-it-yourself activities.
1'71
A more attractive substitute for reliance upon new products
is the second alternative described above-replacing old products
less frequently and replacing some worn-out products with used,
rather than new, products. 12  Older products are frequently fair
yourself" kits, the sellers may be liable for accidents caused by errors in assembly
or use due to alleged inadequacies in the instructions included in the kits. See,
e.g., Midgley v. S.S. Kresge Co., 55 Cal. App. 3d 67, 127 Cal. Rptr. 217 (1976).
169The efficiency gains provided by many manufactured products generally
render do-it-yourself alternatives impractical in a modern industrialized society. For
example, except for the very poor, washing machine-washable clothes by hand on
a routine basis is an unacceptably inefficient substitute for using a washing machine.
Furthermore, for those products the demand for which is created almost entirely by
advertising, do-it-yourself activities are, by hypothesis, poor substitutes. See gen-
erally J. GAr.BaLin, TE ArvFmuENr Socm (1958).
In this context, it is interesting to observe that in the early days of the indus-
trial revolution, some courts may have been motivated to replace strict liability with
negligence principles "by a desire to make the risk-creating enterprises of a devel-
oping industrial economy less subject to liability than they had been under the
earlier common law." Peck, Negligence and Liability Without Fault in Tort Law,
in U.S. DEP'T oF TRANsPoTATioN, Auuomomz INSURANCE: AND Co~MENsAr1ON
STuDy: TE ORIGINS AN DEvELoimNT OF THE NEGLIGENCE ACTION 51 (1970).
Presumably, this was done to allow such enterprises to compete more favorably with
do-it-yourself alternatives. See generally M. Honwrrz, TiE TRANsFoRmAmToN OF
AmcrAN LAw, 1780-1860, at 63-108 (1977).
170 For example, the relatively few people who are driven to washing clothes
by hand by the imposition of a risk tax on washing machines presumably will have
turned to a safer, albeit less efficient, cleaning method.
Imposing a risk tax on new products may not always force consumers to use
safer substitutes, however. For example, imposing a risk tax on a new safety device
may deter some consumers from buying it. For a discussion of a similar problem
in the area of commercially provided services, see notes 202-04 infra & accompany-
ing text.
171 Continuing the example in the preceding footnotes, the risks inherent in
washing clothes by hand presumably are more easily assessed than are the risks
associated with using power-driven equipment In addition, the individual is more
likely to act sensibly in assessing the former risks because he is the only one likely
to be injured. But with many products, including power-driven washing machines,
nonuser bystanders are exposed to some of the risks, and some users are for that
reason more inclined to ignore even accurate risk assessments.
172 Consumer behavior of this sort causes the number and average age of
products in use to rise. Obviously, this phenomenon only occurs with durable
goods. For example, the cyclical nature of new car sales is generally attributed to
decisions of car owners at the margin to retain their cars for longer or shorter
periods. See generally Quite a difference from last year, Bus. WEEK, Oct. 27, 1975,
at 24; The '75s get off to a dismal start, Bus. W=, Oct. 26, 1974, at 36. For a
court's acknowledgement of the same self-defeating possibility in a somewhat dif-
ferent context, see International Harvester Co. v. Ruckelshaus, 478 F.2d 615, 634
(D.C. Cir. 1973).
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substitutes for relatively new products 173 and generally present
greater defect-related risks. 74 Moreover, a risk tax cannot reach
used-product substitutes as directly as it can reach new products.1'7
To some extent, the potential distortion produced by the avail-
ability of used-product substitutes could be reduced by holding
manufacturers responsible throughout the useful lives of the new
products they sell, even when those lives are rather long. 7 6 But
there are practical limits to these extensions.17 7  On balance, it
must be conceded that the imposition of strict liability on new-
products sellers produces some distortion in the form of under-
consumption of new products generally.
178
On the other hand, refusing to subject new-products sellers
to strict liability would generate substantially greater distortion in
the form of overconsumption of relatively risky new products. In
a competitive marketplace some new products are, by hypothesis,
highly substitutable for one another, and the differentials in defect-
related risks among these substitutable products are frequently
substantial. It follows that in the absence of strict liability, riskier
products enjoy significant price advantages.17 9 Moreover, con-
sumers generally are unable to assess the risks associated with
product defects and frequently are unwilling or unable to act ef-
173 Certainly a used washing machine is a better substitute for a new one than
is washing clothes by hand. On the other band, American manufacturers rely
heavily on advertising to reduce the substitutability of older products for new. See
generally J. GArnArrH, supra note 169, at 155-60.
174 It may reasonably be presumed that the risks of mechanical failure increase
with a product's age. Moreover, many newer product designs tend to be safer than
older designs, due in large measure to greater governmental regulation and increased
exposure to products liability. For a critical review of this trend toward greater
safety, see Guzzardi, The Mindless Pursuit of Safety, Foavn u, Apr. 9, 1979, at 54.
175 When a product is used beyond its expected useful life, the original com-
mercial sellers are not liable for defects. See note 167 supra. And in cases involv-
ing used products purchased from commercial suppliers, many courts do not impose
strict liability on those suppliers. See notes 85-86 supra & accompanying text.
176 See, e.g., Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1977),
in which the plaintiff recovered against the manufacturer for injuries sustained
while using an 18-year-old clothes dryer in a laundromat: a design defect in the
machine caused a safety mechanism to fail.
177 The biggest practical limit is the fact that as products age, they are subject
to increasingly varied patterns of maintenance and use. Beyond some point in the
average life of a given type of product, it becomes impossible adequately to differ-
entiate among individual products on the basis of the treatment each has received.
Thus, a presumption that the user is responsible is both fair and unavoidable. See
note 167 supra.
178 It must be remembered that avoidance costs can be too high. See note 6
supra. The inefficiencies associated with too great a reliance on do-it-yourself sub-
stitutes constitute such distortions.
179 Carbonated and noncarbonated bottled beverages are good examples of
relatively substitutable products that present very different defect-related risks.
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fectively on those assessments. 80 Thus, although imposing strict
products liability on commercial sellers of new products generates
some underconsumption of new products generally, refusing to
impose such liability would generate distortion of significantly
greater magnitude.'8 '
2. Commercial Lessors
In general, the foregoing analysis applies equally well to the
decision to extend strict liability to commercial products lessors.
82
Moreover, the extension of the boundaries to include such lessors
provides an example of the "because we have come this far, we
probably should go further" approach mentioned earlier. For
many consumers, leasing products on a long-term basis from a com-
mercial lessor is a very good substitute for buying new products.8 8
If products lessors were not held strictly liable, the products they
supplied would enjoy a competitive advantage over new products
sold commercially, and distortion would result.84 Of course, these
price advantages and distortion would be reduced if manufacturers
and other sellers above the lessors in the chains of distribution were
strictly liable for the defect-related accident costs generated by
leased products. 8 5 But a substantial portion of such costs would
exceed the effective liabilities of products sellers higher up in the
chain. (This portion would be at least as great as the liabilities of
the retail products sellers for whom lessors most frequently sub-
stitute in the chains of commercial product distribution.) Com-
180 See note 3 supra & accompanying text.
181 Moreover, imposing strict liability on these manufacturers may significantly
reduce the marginal real costs of product defects, thereby swamping the distortion
effects produced by the underconsumption of new products. See notes 15, 164, &
165 supra & accompanying text.
182 Thus, generally speaking, do-it-yourself alternatives are not highly substi-
tutable for leased products; some leased products are highly substitutable for one
another; differentials in risks among substitutable leased products are substantial; and
consumers generally underassess those risks.
18s See Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434, 448, 212
A.2d 769, 776 (1965) (noting recent, rapid growth of vehicle-leasing industry).
See also Sign of the Times: Rentals are Booming, U.S. NEws & Wou.D REP., Dec.
9, 1974, at 88. Commercial lessors stress this high degree of substitutability in their
advertising. See Cintrone, 45 N.J. at 448-49 n.1, 212 A.2d at 776-77 n.1.
184 Leased products are probably no riskier than products purchased new. But
the high degree of substitutability of leased products for new ones might lead to
such pervasive use of leasing that the objectives of strict products liability would be
undermined.
185 See, e.g., Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 301 (1970).
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mercial products lessors must be held strictly liable for this uncom-
pensated portion of accident costs if distortion is to be minimized. 8 6
3. Restaurant Operators and Commercial Sellers
of New Housing
Restaurant operators and commercial sellers of new housing
now face less competition from noncommercial, do-it-yourself sub-
stitutes than they once did.8 7  Imposition of a risk tax upon these
commercial activities when this competition was stronger would
have exacerbated the price advantages enjoyed by their noncom-
mercial substitutes, producing potentially significant distortions.8 s
For example, had strict liability for defective food and drink been
imposed on restaurant operators under such circumstances, a
marginal shift away from eating in restaurants would have oc-
curred. Compared to the corresponding shifts away from purchas-
ing or leasing products, this shift-and the resulting distortion-
would have been more significant. The noncommercial alterna-
tives to eating out were better substitutes for their commercial
counterparts than the noncommercial alternatives to new products
were for theirs. 8 9 Moreover, one can reasonably assume that the
186 Retailers, after all, are held strictly liable. See note 30 supra. Interest-
ingly, the court in Cintrone v. Hertz Truck Leasing & Rental Serv., 45 N.J. 434,
212 A.2d 769 (1965), held the lessor liable to an extent exceeding that of a new-
products seller. The truck in that case was almost three years old at the time of
the accident. Id. at 442, 212 A.2d at 773. A retailer seller of the same truck
would almost certainly not have been liable. See note 167 supra & accompanying
text. This greater measure of lessor liability is explained and supported by the
present analysis, inasmuch as the lessor in Cintrone in effect invited and induced
the lessee's employees to treat all the trucks as perfect substitutes for one another,
regardless of their age, Cintrone, 45 N.J. at 448-49, 212 A.2d at 777.
187 Indeed, at one time most families built their own houses, and most people
ate in restaurants only when traveling. The shifts toward paying others to build
homes or prepare meals occurred gradually. Only recently has it become fairly
commonplace for most Americans to pay for these services. Regarding the decline
in do-it-yourself home building, see notes 196-98 infra & accompanying text. The
shift to eating out has been especially dramatic in recent years. See generally
Eating Out: A Binge That Defies Recession, U.S. NEws & Wonr. E Pm,., Feb. 19,
1979, at 62. In 1977, the food-service industry absorbed $87 billion, accounted for
one of every three dollars spent for food, and was growing at a rate of 11% per year.
See Langway & Nicholson, America: Out to Eat, NEwswr_.mK Oct. 3, 1977, at 86, 86.
188 The significance of this concern is suggested by the frequently advanced
rationale for the mid-nineteenth century shift from a regime of strict liability to one
of negligence: that the growth of industry would have been curtailed had develop-
ing industries been subject to the earlier, stricter forms of tort liability. See note
169 supra.
189 Until recently, most people viewed eating at home as an adequate substitute
for eating at a local restaurant. The rapid growth of the restaurant industry in
recent years is due in large measure to the ability of restaurant operators to convince
the consuming public that eating at home substitutes for eating out no better than
it substitutes for going on a vacation or going to church. See note 192 infra.
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
noncommercial eating environments into which the imposition of a
risk tax on restaurant operators would have driven some consumers
contained at least as many defect-related risks as the restaurants
they would have left behind.190
Presumably, the traditional refusal to impose strict liability on
restaurant operators resulted in some distortion due to the in-
ability of consumers to distinguish relatively risky from relatively
safe establishments. But there are reasons to believe that this in-
ability was a less significant cause of distortion than the cor-
responding inability of consumers to assess the relative defect-related
risks of various manufactured products.191
In recent years, two changes have combined to reduce the
potential distortion caused by extending strict products liability to
restaurant operators. First, the noncommercial alternatives are
generally less substitutable for eating out than they once were;
and second, the commercially available alternatives-purchasing
manufactured, "ready to eat" products for home consumption-are
now more substitutable. Gradually, the typical restaurant operator
has evolved from a commercial extension of the individual home-
maker into an integral part of the commercial system for distribut-
ing manufactured goods. Because of this evolution, the distortion
effects of imposing strict liability upon restaurant operators have
diminished: relatively fewer consumers at the margin will be driven
to do-it-yourself substitutes by the imposition of strict liability on
restaurants. 192 In contrast, the potential distortion effects of re-
190 One survey found that over two million persons suffer some form of food
poisoning each year, and that members of six out of ten households are likely to
suffer food poisoning. See Watch out for food poisoning, CHANI NG Tnms, July,
1977, at 4.
191 Two factors combined to reduce the significance of consumers' inability to
assess relative risks. First, because restaurants tended to be local--or perhaps
regional--operations, one may assume that they developed reputations that enabled
patrons to avoid the riskiest establishments. Second, public health regulations were
passed relatively early in an effort to reduce and make more uniform defect-related
risks. See, e.g., Act of May 16, 1913, ch. 552, §§ 343-a to -c, 1913 N.Y. Laws 1488-
1489 (current version at N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw §§ 1350-1354 (McKinney 1971 &
Supp. 1979)); Agricultural Law of 1909, ch. 9, §§40, 41, 200, 1909 N.Y. Consol.
Laws 14, 15, 47 (current version at N.Y. AGmc. & Mrs. Law § 199-a (McKinney
1972)).
192 The point is not that restaurant patrons in general are insensitive to price
increases, but that the relative percentage of patrons at the margin who would
turn to do-it-yourself substitutes is growing smaller. At least three factors appear
to have contributed to this change. First, restaurant operators (especially the large
chains, which make up a significant portion of the industry) have succeeded in
using advertising to increase consumer differentiation between eating out and
eating at home. See generally note 187 supra & note 193 infra. Second, as
society becomes increasingly mobile, more people find themselves away from home
and forced to eat out more often. (Circumstantial support for these assertions is
found in the dramatic growth in recent years of the travel-services industry. See,
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fusing to impose strict liability have grown: if restaurant operators
are not held strictly liable, they will enjoy a comparative price
advantage over the retail sellers of prepared foodstuffs with whom
they increasingly compete 193 and to whom strict liability without
question applies.194 Again, distortion of one kind or another is
unavoidable; including restaurant operators within the boundaries
of strict products liability produces less distortion than does ex-
cluding them.
Recent similar changes in connection with home builder-
sellers tend to justify their inclusion within the boundaries of strict
liability.195 With the advent of mass production following World
War 11,196 noncommercial, do-it-yourself alternatives have become
increasingly less substitutable for purchasing new housing.197 And
although two commercially available alternatives-purchasing used
housing and renting a place to live-may not have become more
substitutable, a third-purchasing "ready to use" housing com-
ponents-has. 98 Furthermore, suppliers of such components are
subject to strict liability.199 Thus, the net distortion of imposing
strict liability on commercial builder-sellers of new housing has
e.g., Too Good To Be True, FORBES, May 15, 1976 at 46.) And third, as growing
numbers of people abandon the traditional single-family home, do-it-yourself meal
preparation becomes less feasible. For example, there are over 40 million single
adults in the United States today, with a combined spending power of at least
$205 billion. See generally Rise of the "Singles"-40 Million Free Spenders, U.S.
NEws & Wo=r_ REP., Oct. 7, 1974, at 54, 54. The food-service industry believes
that these adults have contributed greatly to the growth of that industry. See note
187 supra.
193 The growth of the industry in prepared, processed, and manufactured foods
in recent years has been substantial. See generally The Burger That Conquered
the Country, TIME, Sept. 17, 1973, at 84 (traces steps taken to render eating at
McDonald's restaurants a unique experience). Increasingly, the choice facing
consumers is not so much whether to eat manufactured foods as where to eat
them-at home or at a restaurant.
194 See, e.g., Barbeau v. Roddy Mfg. Co., 431 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1970);
Gonzales v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 147 Colo. 358, 363 P.2d 667 (1961); Food Fair
Stores v. Macurda, 93 So. 2d 860 (Fla. 1957). See also Darryl v. Ford Motor Co.,
440 S.W.2d 630 (Tex. 1969).
195 See authorities cited in note 45 supra.
196 See generally Keerdoja, supra note 49, at 18.
197 It is interesting to note that the early decisions imposing strict liability
involved commercial sellers of mass-produced housing, rather than builder-sellers of
single, custom-built homes. See, e.g., Schipper v. Levitt & Sons, Inc., 44 N.J. 70,
207 A.2d 314 (1965). Today, however, many courts would extend strict liability
to all commercial sellers of housing. See, e.g., McDonald v. Mianecki, 79 N.J.
275, 398 A.2d 1283 (1979).
3
98 See generally M. DRUmy, MOBILE Homms: THE UNREcoG IZD REvorLuoN
rN A.amucAN HousING (rev. ed. 1972); Lampe, Mobiles, Modulars: Two Ways to
Low-Cost Housing, PoPuLr.A MEcHANrs, June, 1975, at 88.
199 See, e.g., Gauthier v. Mayo, 77 Mich. App. 513, 258 N.W.2d 748 (1977)
(modular homes); Champion Mobile Homes v. Rasmussen, 553 S.W.2d 237 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1977) (mobile homes).
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diminished (fewer consumers at the margin will be driven to do-it-
yourself substitutes) and the potential distortion of refusing to
impose strict liability has grown (if such builder-sellers escape strict
liability, they will enjoy a competitive advantage over the retail
sellers of manufactured housing components with whom they in-
creasingly compete).
4. Commercial Providers of Pure Services
It remains to be demonstrated that the consensus against im-
posing strict liability on pure-services providers also minimizes the
distortion effects of distinguishing between substantially substitut-
able activities. To a degree exceeding that involving manufac-
tured products, do-it-yourself substitutes are available to which
consumers at the margin could be expected to turn if commercially
provided, nonprofessional services were subjected to risk taxes.
200
Moreover, the resulting distortion effects would be enhanced by
the fact that the noncommercial substitutes are frequently riskier
than their commercially available counterparts. 201 Were repairers,
for example, to be held strictly liable, as some commentators have
advocated, 202 do-it-yourself repairs, including doing without safety-
related repairs, would attract consumers at the margin.
Although do-it-yourself substitutes are less available for pro-
fessional services, imposing a risk tax on these services would make
them less affordable. Even with respect to health-care services,
consumption of which seems to be relatively insensitive to price,203
20o For example, although the average consumer may not seriously consider
building his own home, he may consider painting or repairing it. Indeed, in the
face of rising living costs, the "do it yourself" movement seems to be expanding
fairly rapidly. See generally Do-It-Yourself is Big Business, NATION'S Bus., Nov.
1972, at 63.
201 Commercial repairers are liable in negligence, and presumably are thereby
pressured to maintain adequate safety standards. "Do-it-yourselfers," in contrast,
are substantially immune from tort liability. Certainly they cannot sue themselves;
nor can their friends or members of their families often succeed in tort actions
against them. See H. CLAmr, THE LAw or DommsTic RELATIoNs 252-60 (1968)
and cases cited therein (intrafamily immunities); W. PnossEn, supra note 7, at
859-69 and cases cited therein (intrafamily immunities). See generally RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF TORTs §§ 330, 342 (1965) (limited duties of care owed to
social guests). But see W. Pnossma, supra note 7, at 378-79, 398-99.
202 See, e.g., Baldwin, supra note 72, at 323-24, 338-39; Greenfield, supra
note 4, at 661-62; Note, Application of Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for
Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAC. L.J. 867 (1977); 4
N.M.L. REv. 271 (1974).
203 Two factors may cause demand for health-care services to be relatively
inelastic compared to other services: (1) the presence of third-party-payment plans,
see note 210 infra & accompanying text, and (2) the fact that some medical
services are necessary to sustain life.
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courts have expressed concern over the safety implications of de-
terring patients from obtaining effective treatment by holding
health-care providers strictly liable.2°
Of course, refusing to include commercial providers of services
within the boundaries of strict products liability generates distor-
tion because such services are substitutable for commercially avail-
able alternatives that are included. For example, one commenta-
tor has observed that the traditional refusal of courts to apply strict
liability to product repairers allows repairers to compete unfairly
with sellers of new products, whose activities are subject to strict
liability.205 On balance, however, the distortion due to imposing
strict liability on repairers is probably greater than the distortion
due to refusing to impose such liability because do-it-yourself re-
pairs are more substitutable for commercial repairs than commer-
cial repairs are for new products.
20 6
In at least one other respect, the distortion effects of refusing to
extend strict liability to providers of pure services are less than
they might first appear. It will be recalled that the differentials in
defect-related risks among commercially supplied new products are
assumed to be substantial, and that a refusal to impose strict liability
would produce significant distortion in the form of overconsumption
of relatively risky products. 207  With respect to some commercially
supplied services, in contrast, the differentials in defect-related risks
(and thus the distortion effects of a refusal to impose strict liability)
204 See, e.g., Shepard v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 33 Cal. App. 3d 606, 611-13, 109
Cal. Rptr. 132, 135-36 (1973); Brody v. Overlook Hosp., 127 NJ. Super. 331,
337-38, 317 A.2d 392, 396 (App. Div. 1974), aff'd, 66 NJ. 448, 332 A.2d 596
(1975); Magrine v. Krasnica, 94 N.J. Super. 228, 238, 227 A.2d 539, 545 (Law
Div. 1967), aff'd sub nom. Magrine v. Spector, 100 N.J. Super. 223, 241 A.2d 637
(App. Div. 1968), aff'd per curiam, 53 N.J. 259, 250 A.2d 129 (1969). Although
these are not "pure services" cases, but fall into the category of "sale-service
hybrids," the judicial concern over inhibiting the flow of health-care services appears
to apply equally well to both categories.
205 See Note, Application of Strict Liability to Repairers: A Proposal for
Legislative Action in the Face of Judicial Inaction, 8 PAc. L.J. 865, 876-77 (1977).
206 Replacement of a product substitutes most effectively for repair when the
defect requiring repair prevents the product from functioning adequately, and when
the product is near the end of its useful life. For relatively new products, repair
is most often the only feasible alternative. In contrast, do-it-yourself repair is
often a good substitute for commercial repair because both new and used products
may lend themselves to do-it-yourself repair. Furthermore, if the repairs require
abilities beyond those of average individuals, going without the repairs is a sub-
stitute when the defect does not greatly interfere with the product's functioning.
Thus, in the cases of greatest concern in the present context-those in which
defects increase the risks of harm but do not interfere with the product's
functioning (that is, those in which the risks of accidents are greatest)--do-it-
yourself repairs (including doing without repairs) are much more substitutable for
commercially provided repairs than are product replacements.
2 0 7 See notes 179-80 supra & accompanying text.
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are lower. At least in the case of professional suppliers of services,
a greater uniformity in approach among suppliers is more likely due
to the maintenance of professional standards. Individual providers
may fall below those standards, but the negligence system aims at
minimizing the social costs of such deviations.20 Apart from these
individual instances of provider negligence, however, there is rela-
tively less of a basis, in terms of defect-related risks, for choosing
one professional over another. In effect, the relative uniformity of
approach achieved through professional standards tends to distribute
defect-related risks more uniformly among the professional-services
providers.20 9  It follows that the distortion effects of allowing such
providers to escape strict liability for defect-related accident costs
will be less than in the case of new-products sellers, among whom
differentials in defect-related risks are presumably more substantial.
Moreover, the risk of creating market distortions by refusing to
impose strict liability on professional providers of services has been
reduced by the adoption of third-party-payment plans covering the
costs of medical care.210
D. Applying the Criteria to the Areas of
Continuing Controversy
This section will examine the potential distortion effects of
extending or refusing to extend the boundaries of strict products
liability to include various commercial enterprises whose inclusion
would be controversial.
1. Commercial Sellers of Used Products
Deciding whether to impose strict liability on commercial
sellers of used products demonstrates most clearly the relevance of
Second Best Theory to products liability boundary disputes. Al-
208With very rare exceptions, physicians and other professional health-care
providers are liable in negligence when they fail to conform to the standards of
their professions. See generally McCoid, The Care Required of Medical Prac-
titioners, 12 VA-D. L. Rv. 549, 558-60 (1959); Pearson, The Role of Custom in
Medical Malpractice Cases, 51 IND. L.J. 528 (1976). In theory, the negligence
system pressures providers to conform to the relevant standards. See generally
Schwartz & Komesar, Doctors, Damages and Deterrence, 298 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1282 (1978).
209 The term "defect-related risks" is used here in the sense of risks associated
with providing health care that conforms to the relevant professional standards-
that is, risks inhering in the standards themselves. By hypothesis, if all providers
conform more or less to the same standards, these risks will be distributed more or
less uniformly among them.
210 Generally speaking, third-party-payment plans cause demand for services
to be less sensitive to price because subscribers do not pay premiums in proportion
to their consumption. See generally Newhouse, Phelps, & Schwartz, Policy Options
and the Impact of National Health Insurance, 290 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1345 (1974).
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though the availability to consumers of noncommercial substitutes
for commercially supplied products may be questioned in the other
areas of controversy, it is beyond doubt that used products obtained
from noncommercial sellers are highly substitutable for used
products obtained commercially. Furthermore, commercial sellers
face strong and effective competition from their noncommercial
counterparts.21 1 To impose a substantial risk tax upon commercial
used-products sellers through strict products liability would, there-
fore, drive consumers at the margin to readily available noncom-
mercial substitutes. 21
2
Of course, these noncommercial substitutes are reachable in-
directly by strict products liability, at least to the extent that manu-
facturers are exposed to strict liability for some defect-caused acci-
dents notwithstanding resale of the product.213  But even though
resale poses no theoretical bar to recovery, as a practical matter
manufacturers are infrequently held liable for accidents involving
older products that have been resold one or more times.214  Thus,
211 For a description of the used-motor-vehicles market in recent years, in-
cluding the suggestion "that dealer sales have been subject to a long-term erosion
with the private market gaining at the dealers' expense," see BUREAU OF CoNsuiER
PROTECTION, FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, SA.E OF USED MoToR VEMCLEs, FINAL
STAFF REPORT TO TnE FEDERAL TRADE COMISSION AND PROPOSED TRADE REGULA-
TIN RuLE (16 CFR Part 455) 455-57 (1978) [hereinafter cited as FTC FiNAL
REPORT].
212 Some support for this assertion comes from a study of the impact on the
used-motor-vehicles market of a recently enacted Wisconsin law requiring dealers
to inspect vehicles, make safety repairs, disclose inspection results to purchasers, and
refuse to sell unsafe vehicles, 8 Wis. Admin. Code ch. MVD 24 (1977). See FTC
FiNAL REPORT, supra note 211, at 19-24. That study indicates that in the two
years following implementation of the Wisconsin law, significant shifts occurred
away from the commercial toward the private market. See id. 463 n.24. These
data may be especially significant in the present context, given the differences
between the Wisconsin law (essentially a fair disclosure act) and strict liability in
tort. The Wisconsin law and the proposed FTC Trade Regulation Rule, 41 Fed.
Reg. 1089 (1976) (to be codified at 16 C.F.R. §455), are intended to build
greater public confidence in the commercial market in order to enhance that
market's appeal to consumers. See id. 458. In contrast, strict liability in tort,
unaccompanied by any formal disclosures of the sort required by the Wisconsin
law, would be less likely to build public confidence in the market. Indeed, the
publicity that legal actions would attract might well erode public confidence.
Commercial sellers might attempt to counter this tendency with advertising, but the
success of such an approach is doubtful. Thus, imposing strict liability on com-
mercial sellers of used cars might well cause an even greater shift away from the
commercial market than did the Wisconsin statute.
213 See, e.g., Court v. Grezelinski, 72 Ill. 2d 141, 379 N.E.2d 281 (1978)
(design defect); Iadicicco v. Duffy, 60 A.D.2d 905, 401 N.Y.S.2d 557 (1978)
(design defect or defective manufacture makes out prima facie case).
214 See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. McCamish, 559 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1977) (five-
year-old truck); Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d 312
(1967) (six-year-old washing machine).
In order to invoke the doctrine of strict products liability, the plaintiff must
show that the product was defective when it left the manufacturer's hands. See
[Vol. 128:1036
STRICT PRODUCTS LIABILITY
the "unreachability" of noncommercial used-products sellers is only
partially offset by the "reachability" of manufacturers for accidents
involving used, resold products.
Even if noncommercially supplied used products are highly
substitutable for their commercially supplied counterparts and are
relatively unreachable by strict liability, the potential distortion
effects of imposing strict liability on commercial used-products
sellers would be reduced if the noncommercial substitutes were
generally safer than their commercial counterparts. It may reason-
ably be presumed, however, that, in general, used products supplied
by noncommercial sellers are riskier than used products available
commercially. Even in the absence of strict liability, commercial
used-products sellers are liable for their negligent failure to discover,
correct, and warn against dangerous defects. 215 In contrast, non-
commercial sellers are, as a practical matter, substantially immune
from negligence-based liability.216 In addition to commercial sellers'
liability for negligence, the adverse publicity generated by tort ac-
dons and the requirements imposed by state regulation2 17 give them
greater incentive to discover and correct dangerous defects than
noncommercial sellers are likely to have. Furthermore, commercial
sellers are generally more expert at detecting defects in used
products.218  To be sure, the available data suggest that noncom-
mercial sellers are generally more truthful than their commercial
note 167 supra. The resale of a product often makes this proof more difficult, if
not impossible.
Many of the cases in which manufacturers are held strictly liable for defects
in older products involve defective designs. See, e.g., cases cited in note 213 supra.
Because the design of a product does not change with age, manufacturers are ex-
posed to liability for longer periods with respect to their designs. In response, a
number of states have recently enacted statutes of repose that reduce the periods
during which manufacturers are exposed to liability. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 95.031(2) (West Supp. 1978); On. REV. STAT. § 30.905 (1977). For a critical
analysis of these statutes, see Phillips, An Analysis of Proposed Reform of Products
Liability: Statutes of Limitations, 56 N.C.L. REv. 663 (1978).
215 See, e.g., Benton v. Sloss, 38 Cal. 2d 399, 404, 240 P.2d 575, 578 (1952);
Drummond v. American Ins. Co., 159 So. 2d 61, 63 (La. Ct. App. 1963); McKinney
v. Frodsham, 57 Wash. 2d 126, 129-30, 356 P.2d 100, 102-03 (1960), modified on
other grounds, 58 Wash. 2d 12, 360 P.2d 576 (1961). Of course, this exposure to
liability for negligence does not eliminate the significance of moving to a rule of
strict liability because commercial sellers are liable in negligence only for failing to
discover defects that are discoverable through reasonable inspection. See, e.g.,
Heilig v. Studebaker Corp., 347 F.2d 686, 690 (10th Cir. 1965); Woolley v.
Uebelhor, 239 Md. 318, 325, 211 A.2d 302, 305-06 (1965).
216 See note 201 supra.
217 For example, most states require commercial used-car dealers to correct
defects in the vehicles they offer for sale. See FTC FiNAL RPtORT, supra note 211,
at 393 n.3, 519-25.
2 18 See FTC FnAL REPonT, supra note 211, at 425.
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counterparts about the relevant facts of product age and prior use.219
But disclosing such information does not eliminate defect-related
risks. On balance, therefore, application of the criteria developed
earlier strongly suggests that relatively significant distortion could
be expected were courts generally to extend strict products liability
to include commercial sellers of used products.20
It remains to consider the potential distortion effects of refus-
ing to impose strict liability upon commercial used-products sellers.
That some distortion would be generated by such a refusal may not
be doubted. For one thing, if commercial sellers of used products
were allowed to escape strict liability, the price advantage they enjoy
over new-products sellers would be increased, thereby causing some
shifts away from the purchase of new products. Presumably, how-
ever, commercial and noncommercial used products substitute for
each other better than commercial used products substitute for
new products. Thus, the distortion produced by refusing to extend
strict products liability to used-products sellers would not be as
great as the effect of the contrary decision.
Refusing to impose strict products liability on commercial
sellers of used products might create another source of distortion,
for this refusal would give the greatest competitive advantage to
those who sold the riskiest used products. Two factors, however,
combine to reduce these effects below what might otherwise be ex-
pected. First, commercial used-products sellers have less control
over the quality of the products they sell than have manufacturers.
For example, they cannot redesign their products to improve safety.
Thus, if differentials in risk due to discoverable defects are put
aside,2 21 it may reasonably be assumed that the remaining defect-
related risks tend to be distributed more randomly and, over time,
more uniformly among those sellers. Second, at least some of these
sellers are being pressured by state regnlatory schemes to do what
they can to reduce risks.222 Therefore, although some overconsump-
219 See, e.g., FTC FiNr LREPoRT, supra note 211, at 423-25 (data limited to
used-car sales).220 The total costs of accidents caused by purchased used products would in-
crease if the gains in safety achieved by imposing strict liability on commercial
used-products sellers, see note 15 supra & accompanying text, did not at least equal
the losses in safety represented by marginal shifts to the private market. See note
165 supra & accompanying text. Given the existing legal pressures on commercial
used-products sellers to detect and correct dangerous product defects, see notes
215 & 217 supra & accompanying text, it is unlikely that the gains in safety would
outweigh the losses.
221 Presumably, such differentials are already being reduced by factors other
than strict liability, including the imposition of liability for negligent conduct. See
notes 215 & 217 supra.
222 See note 217 supra.
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tion of relatively risky commercially supplied used products may
occur as a result of refusing to tax these products in proportion
to their relative risks, this effect should not be significant.
It follows from this application of the criteria developed earlier
that greater distortion is likely to result from including commercial
used-products sellers within the boundaries of strict products lia-
bility than from excluding them. Moreover, the distortion effects
of including these suppliers would probably take the form of shifts
in consumption favoring comparatively risky products. Consumers
at the margin would be driven away from commercial used-products
sources that are relatively safer, due to various regulatory pressures,
and toward noncommercial sources of used products that cannot be
regulated and are less safe. A policymaker might nevertheless de-
cide to impose strict liability on commercial used-products sellers
out of a sense of fundamental fairness, or as a means of spreading
defect-related accident costs to the greatest extent possible.223 But
such a decision should be reached only after considering the distor-
tion that could be expected to ensue.
2. Suppliers of Sale-Service Hybrids
On balance, the present analysis offers little guidance on the
issue of holding professional sale-service providers strictly liable for
defect-caused harm. Certainly in the case of medical professionals,
distortion effects are less relevant because of the pervasiveness of
third-party-payment plans.22 4 And when such plans do not exist, the
potential distortion effects of imposing strict liability are not likely
to be significant because of the relative unavailability of do-it-
yourself substitutes for professional health care.225  On the other
hand, the fact that the sale-service providers are professionals prob-
ably tends to reduce the differentials in defect-related risks among
them, thus reducing the significance of the potential distortion ef-
fects of refusing to impose strict liability.226  It follows that other
policy considerations must inform the decision whether to include
professional sale-service providers within the boundaries of strict
products liability.
223 See notes 11-12, 17, & 88-89 supra & accompanying text.
224 See note 210 supra.
225 Although consumers might decide to forgo medical treatment altogether, it
is difficult to perceive how they could treat themselves in the sorts of circumstances
typically presented in these sale-service hybrid cases: e.g., defective hypodermic
needles, defective prosthetic devices, defective contact lenses, and contaminated
blood. See cases cited in notes 106-07 supra.
226 See note 209 supra & accompanying text.
1086 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW
The present analysis may offer more guidance in connection
with nonprofessional sale-service providers. Although do-it-yourself
substitutes for the service components of these sale-service hybrids
are available to consumers,227 such substitutes are generally unavail-
able for the sales components. 228 A consumer who decides to dye
his hair, for example, supplies his own service component, but he
must turn to commercial sellers for the dye. Thus, as courts in
these cases have recognized, the nonprofessional sale-service provider
is analogous to a retailer as far as the sales component is con-
cerned.229 Because nonmanufacturing sellers are strictly liable for
defective products, 230 sale-service providers that are allowed to escape
strict liability for the defective products they supply will enjoy a
competitive advantage over product retailers. The result will be a
distortion in the form of consumers at the margin opting to obtain
products from sale-service providers rather than from retailers.231
On balance, the present analysis suggests that the potential dis-
tortion effects of extending the boundaries of strict products liability
to include nonprofessional sale-service providers will be less signifi-
cant than the potential effects of refusing to extend the boundaries.
This consideration standing alone is probably insufficient to justify
extending the boundaries in this fashion; but to the extent that it
coincides with a discernible expansionist trend in the case law, it
confirms the judgments reached on other policy grounds.232
3. Nonsale Suppliers
As discussed earlier,233 nonsale suppliers may be divided into
two subcategories: those who charge their customers specifically for
use of the products supplied, and those who treat the costs of supply-
ing the products as overhead and charge only indirectly for their
227 See note 200 supra & accompanying text.
228 See note 169 supra & accompanying text.
229 See, e.g., Young v. Aro Corp., 36 Cal. App. 3d 240, 246, 111 Ca]. Rptr.
535, 538 (1973) (court equated defendant with a manufacturer); Nowakowski v.
Hoppe Tire Co., 39 Ill. App. 3d 155, 162, 349 N.E.2d 578, 584-85 (1976) (court
equated defendant with a supplier); Newmark v. Gimbers, Inc., 54 N.J. 585, 600,
258 A.2d 697, 704 (1969) (court equated defendant with a retailer).
230 See notes 29-30 supra & accompanying text.
231 To be sure, products obtained from sale-service providers are not perfect
substitutes for the same products purchased at retail-consumers are required to pay
for the service components in order to take advantage of the "bargains" on the sales
components. But the substitutability of these products seems great enough that, if
sale-service providers were excluded from strict liability, the products they supply
would be overconsumed generally, and relatively risky products would be overcon-
sumed in comparison with relatively safe products.
232 See notes 108-17 supra & accompanying text.
233 See notes 118-20 supra & accompanying text.
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use. For the first of these subcategories, there are relatively few
do-it-yourself substitutes to which consumers could be expected to
turn if nonsale suppliers were held strictly liable.234 Moreover,
when such noncommercial substitutes are available, they tend to be
significantly less risky than the products supplied in the commercial,
nonsale context.235 For typical customers of a laundromat, for ex-
ample, who presumably do not own washing machines or driers,
do-it-yourself substitutes are impractical.23 6 Moreover, a consumer
typically cannot borrow a washing machine from a neighbor. And
for the few potential laundromat users at the margin who would be
driven by a risk tax to wash their clothes by hand, or to forgo either
clothes-soiling activities or even cleanliness, the defect-related risks
of such alternatives would be negligible.237  Thus, significant dis-
tortion in the form of shifts to more dangerous do-it-yourself sub-
stitutes are not likely to be generated by imposing strict liability on
nonsale suppliers in this first subcategory.
On the other hand, refusing to impose a risk tax on these non-
sale suppliers could be expected to generate more significant dis-
tortion, inasmuch as these suppliers provide substitutes for other
commercially available products and services that are already subject
to strict liability. In the laundromat example, a consumer who is
unable to own a washing machine confronts the basic choice be-
tween having his clothes washed at a commercial laundry or wash-
ing them himself at a laundromat. 238 Commercial laundries are
subject to a risk tax-the prices they charge presumably reflect the
costs of injuries to employees caused by the machines used to wash
customers' clothes.239  If laundromats were allowed to escape strict
234 The nonsubstitutability of do-it-yourself activities for the products supplied
by these nonsale suppliers reflects the nonsubstitutability of do-it-yourself activities
for manufactured products generally. See note 169 supra & accompanying text.
235 See note 170 supra & accompanying text.
236 Aside from the lack of facilities for washing and drying clothes by hand,
the efficiency gains presented by washing machines and driers render do-it-yourself
alternatives very unattractive. See note 169 supra.
237 Washing clothes by hand presents relatively few defect-related risks; for-
going activities that tend to soil clothes probably decreases risks of injury; and
forgoing cleanliness may be aesthetically unpleasant, but is unlikely to be risky
unless carried to the extreme.
238 Although other commercial alternatives exist-e.g., linen and diaper services,
industrial uniform services-these alternatives substitute only partially for those
mentioned in the text. As between laundries and laundromats, the latter industry
appears to be growing faster due to a number of factors, including an increase in
the young-adult population and individuals' growing preference to do their own
laundry and dry cleaning. See Vickary, New Technology in Laundry and Cleaning
Services, MoNTrm LAB. Rlv., Feb. 1972, at 54, 58.
239 A portion of these costs are covered by workmen's compensation insurance.
See generally A. LAmsoN, Tum LAw or WornxmEN's Cohm~sATmoN (1978 & Supp.
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liability, they would enjoy a correspondingly greater price advantage
over laundries, and consumers at the margin would shift to them.
To be sure, this price advantage and the resulting overconsumption
of laundromat equipment would be reduced to the extent that the
manufacturers of the washing machines were strictly liable for
defect-related accidents occurring in laundromats.240 As a practical
matter, however, manufacturers escape a significant portion of lia-
bility for laundry equipment that becomes defective due to age,
misuse, or improper maintenance.
241
On balance, then, the criteria advanced in this Article suggest
that greater distortion will be generated by refusing to extend strict
liability to this first subcategory of nonsale suppliers than will be
generated by extending it. Thus, this analysis supports the decisions
of those courts that have imposed strict liability on these suppliers.
2
2
The second subcategory of nonsale suppliers, those who do not
charge specifically for the use of products, presents a less clear
picture. For some products provided by nonsale suppliers in this
subcategory, noncommercially supplied substitutes are generally
available. When a laundromat provides chairs for its customers'
convenience, for example, the chairs are typically no different-ex-
cept for their location-from chairs generally available to those
customers. For example, if imposing a risk tax to cover the costs of
accidents caused by defective chairs would discourage laundromat
operators from providing chairs, some customers could be expected
to bring their own chairs to laundromats, or to leave the laundro-
mats to sit in chairs available elsewhere while their clothes were
being washed.
Thus, imposition of a risk tax on products that customers use
while on business premises and that have substitutes in noncom-
mercial environments would probably create distortion effects fa-
voring consumption of those noncommercial substitutes. More-
over, those substitutes, which largely escape risk tax,243 are
probably riskier than the products provided by nonsale suppliers.244
1979). The rest are presumably covered by the employment contract, which should
reflect the relative levels of risk to which employees are exposed.
240 See, e.g., Thomas v. General Motors Corp., 13 Cal. App. 3d 81, 88, 91 Cal.
Rptr. 301, 305 (1970); Miller v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 568 S.W.2d 648, 650
(Tex. 1977).
241 See, e.g., Westerberg v. School Dist. No. 792, 276 Minn. 1, 148 N.W.2d
312 (1967). See also notes 167, 177, & 214 supra.
242 See notes 121-24 supra.
243 See notes 167 & 241 supra & accompanying text.
244 Even in the absence of strict liability, commercial nonsale suppliers are
liable for their negligent failure to inspect for and repair dangerous defects. See
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It follows that to impose strict liability on commercial establish-
ments would, at the margin, drive consumers out of environments
posing few defect-related risks and into riskier environments, re-
sulting in distortion that might increase accident rates. This dis-
tortion will be reduced to the extent that consumers generally are
better able to assess, and are more willing to respond to, risks in
noncommercial environments. 2 45 Nevertheless, significant distor-
tion could be expected to follow from imposing strict liability on
nonsale suppliers for those products that have counterparts in non-
commercial environments.246
To complete the analysis of this aspect of nonsale suppliers'
strict liability, the potential distortion effects of refusing to impose
strict liability must be considered. Obviously, such a refusal would,
to some extent, encourage overuse by consumers of relatively riskier
commercial establishments and underuse of relatively safer ones.
Distortion of this sort is likely to be minimized, however, because
the defect-related risks of commercially supplied products that have
counterparts generally in society are presumably distributed more
uniformly among commercial enterprises than are other product-
related risks.247 On balance, therefore, the distortion effects of
imposing strict liability on this subcategory of nonsale suppliers
appear to outweigh the distortion effects of refusing to impose
such liability. Moreover, the potential for reducing defect-related
accident costs by pressuring these suppliers to adopt safety mea-
sures appears relatively small.
248
A different result emerges from applying the criteria to the
nonsale suppliers of products that are more uniquely designed for
use in commercial establishments and for which substitutes are
notes 131-32 supra. In contrast, the managers of noncommercial environments
traditionally have been almost immune from tort liability. See note 201 supra.
245 Individuals presumably are more familiar with the furniture in their own
homes than with the furniture made available to them in various commercial estab-
lishments.
246 From an enterprise-liability standpoint, commercial enterprises would be
required to bear social costs that are not uniquely caused by or associated with
those enterprises, thereby producing distortion.
247 For example, "slip and fall" risks and defect-related risks presented by
chairs in waiting rooms are distributed more or less uniformly among commercial
establishments. In contrast, defect-related risks presented by the manufactured
products offered for sale by commercial establishments vary significantly. See note
179 supra & accompanying text. Bicycles, for example, pose greater defect-related
risks than do books.
248 Again, these suppliers are already exposed to liability for their negligence,
see notes 131-32 supra, and presumably will adopt most of the obvious safety meas-
ures available to them. Because in most cases they do not manufacture the products
supplied for the use and convenience of customers, these defendants lack some of
the control over defect-related risks that manufacturing sellers have.
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generally not available.249  The potential distortion effects of im-
posing strict products liability on these suppliers would not be sig-
nificant because, by hypothesis, the noncommercial environments
into which consumers at the margin would be driven by a risk tax
contain relatively few substitutes for such products. In addition,
it may reasonably be assumed that levels of defect-related risks
presented by such products vary significantly among commercial
enterprises. 250 Thus, the distortion effects of refusing to impose
strict liability would be correspondingly increased. But because
nonsale suppliers do not charge directly for use of these products,
the activity of supplying them is only indirectly reachable by a
risk tax: some consumers will use the products without purchasing
goods or services from the supplier and will receive a free ride.251
On balance, however, this analysis supports the imposition of strict
products liability on commercial nonsale suppliers who provide
products for which noncommercial substitutes are not generally
available. 2
52
In sum, the decision whether to impose strict liability on non-
sale suppliers turns on whether the products they supply have close
substitutes in the noncommercial world. Admittedly, courts might
have difficulty distinguishing commercial products that have such
substitutes from those that do not. The glassware supplied to
customers in a restaurant 253 clearly falls into the first category;
elevators, escalators, and bleachers 254 clearly fall into the second.
But a number of cases will come closer to the line. For example,
249 These products include elevators, escalators, and bleachers. See note 254
infra.
250 Smaller commercial establishments, for example, may not have elevators and
escalators.
251 Compare note 133 supra & accompanying text.
252 Again, from an enterprise-liability standpoint, the risks presented by these
products are unique to the commercial enterprises involved. Compare note 246
supra.
253 See, e.g., Shaffer v. Victoria Station, Inc., 91 Wash. 2d 295, 588 P.2d 233
(1978). That court held that strict liability could be imposed on a restaurant
operator for injuries sustained by a customer when his wine glass broke. The court
drew an analogy between the wine glass and product packages, for which new
product sellers are strictly liable. Under the present analysis, glassware supplied
by restaurants is distinguishable from new-product packaging on the ground that
do-it-yourself substitutes are more available for the former than for the latter.
254 Although courts have not imposed strict liability on business establishments
for elevator, escalator, or bleacher accidents, they have applied the res ipsa loquitur
doctrine in negligence cases. See, e.g., Otis Elevator Co. v. Seale, 334 F.2d 928
(5th Cir. 1964) (elevator) (applying Louisiana law); Vandagriff v. J.C. Penney
Co., 228 Cal. App. 2d 579, 39 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1964) (escalator); Boyer v. Iowa
High School Athletic Ass'n, 260 Iowa 1061, 152 N.W.2d 293 (1967) (bleacher);
Gilbert v. Korvette's, Inc., 457 Pa. 602, 327 A.2d 94 (1974) (escalator).
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how should the shopping carts supplied by a supermarket 255 or
the ladders supplied by a "pick them yourself" apple orchardZ
be categorized?
In classifying products of this sort, several considerations must
be borne in mind in addition to those previously described. First,
the focus should be on the uniqueness of the risks presented rather
than on superficial physical dissimilarities between the commercial
products and their noncommercial substitutes. Shopping carts,
for example, should be classified as products without substitutes
in noncommercial environments because of the unique risks they
present 257 rather than because they are deliberately designed to
be of little use outside the supermarket.258 Second, it may not
matter that the products supplied commercially have counterparts
generally available elsewhere if those products are not likely to
be used in the activities that substitute for the commercial activ-
ities. The ladders supplied by a "pick them yourself' orchard il-
lustrate this point nicely. Although ladders are generally available
to consumers in noncommercial environments, those ladders are
unlikely to be used by consumers in the activities that substitute
for spending an afternoon in the orchard.25 9 Thus, substitutes for
the ladders supplied commercially may be "available" to consumers
in noncommercial environments, but distortion of the sort being
considered here will be minimal because the ladders available
elsewhere will not be used, and therefore will not present significant
risks, in the activities to which consumers will turn.
Finally, it must be remembered that the present analysis is
not meant to be applied on a case-by-case basis, nor is it intended to
replace traditional policy considerations. Presumably, courts will
develop fairly broad categories of products within which they may
devise consistent, sensible approaches to products liability cases.
On balance, it probably makes sense to limit the relevance of the
present analysis to those product categories about which judges can
255 See, e.g., Safeway Stores v. Nest-Kart, 21 Cal. 3d 322, 146 Cal. Rptr. 550,
579 P.2d 441 (1978).
256 See, e.g., Gabbard v. Stephenson's Orchard, Inc., 565 S.W.2d 753 (Mo.
Ct. App. 1978).
257 For example, shopping carts may tip over while loaded with heavy items,
may pinch a customer in a concealed hinge, or may tip over while a child is riding
in the seat. These risks may fairly be said to be unique to shopping carts, at least
for the typical users of such carts.
258 The small diameter of the wheels on most shopping carts renders the carts
practically useless in environments that do not have smooth, unbroken floors.
259 Two types of activities come to mind that might substitute for picking
apples in an orchard: (1) buying apples at a store, or (2) spending an afternoon
at the beach. Neither activity is likely to involve a ladder.
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make fairly confident findings about availability of noncommercial
substitutes, and to leave doubtful cases entirely to more traditional
policy analyses.
CONCLUSION
In considering proposed extensions of the boundaries of strict
products liability, courts and commentators have tried to determine
whether a particular extension would be consistent with various
underlying social policies. Debate has focused on the differences
between these social policies, some of which militate in favor of
more expansive, and others in favor of more restrictive, patterns
of liability. To date, no one has considered the possibility that
quite apart from its implications for policy, a proposed new bound-
ary may distinguish between activities that are substitutable from
the consumer's point of view, and thus may distort patterns of
consumption in ways unanticipated, and probably unintended, by
those proposing the boundary extension. The distortion effects of
concern here take the form of shifts in consumption away from
activities included within, and toward substitute activities excluded
from, the boundaries of strict products liability. When these dis-
tortions involve shifts away from relatively safer activities and
toward relatively riskier activities, they may produce results that
detract from, rather than enhance, the traditional policy objectives
of strict products liability.
Exploring the implications of the Theory of the Second Best,
this Article has developed criteria with which to predict in a gen-
eral way the distortions likely to result from given extensions of the
boundaries of strict products liability, and has applied those criteria
to a number of products liability areas-both settled and contro-
versial. It has shown that virtually every boundary extension that
has become settled law conforms to a pattern of decision tending to
minimize the potential distortion effects described herein. With
respect to areas of continuing controversy, evaluation of the predic-
tive criteria tends to support extending the boundaries to include
nonprofessional sale-service providers and certain types of nonsale
suppliers of products. The same analysis points away from the
imposition of strict liability on commercial sellers of used products
and certain other types of nonsale suppliers of products.
As has been emphasized throughout, the criteria developed
and applied herein are intended not to replace traditional policy
analyses in products liability, but to supplement them. A bal-
anced approach is called for, one in which the overall policy objec-
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tives of products liability are tempered by a concern for the impli-
cations of drawing boundaries that distinguish between essentially
substitutable activities. To the extent that this analysis provides
a useful supplement to traditional policy analyses in the field of
products liability, it should provide a similarly useful supplement
in the broader context frequently referred to by torts scholars as
"enterprise liability." 260 Indeed, to the extent that other legal
regulation of conduct, including the criminal law, involves
processes of line drawing and boundary establishment analogous
to the processes examined in this Article, this analysis should have
application beyond the confines of tort law.
261
260 Any enterprise-liability approach presumably would encounter the same
problems with unreachable do-it-yourself activities as are described in this Article.
2 6 1 Criminal proscriptions against nontherapeutic abortions, for example, tend
to drive persons to riskier, do-it-yourself alternatives.
